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5. The Debate about Truth: Pragmatism without Regulative Ideas
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93 5 ALBRECHT WELLMER The Debate about Truth: Pragmatism without Regulative Ideas1 Translated by William Egginton* 1. The classical definition of truth that has largely determined the understanding of the concept in the history of European philosophy comes, as is well known, from Aristotle. Aristotle says: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.”2 This formulation of Aristotle’s has been understood, to a large extent, in the history of European philosophy in the sense of an “agreement,” “adequation,” or finally also a “correspondence theory” of truth. The medieval formulation according to which truth is an “adequatio rei et intellectus” is only one version of this basic idea. Even Kant, in The Critique of Pure Reason, plainly presupposed a corresponding understanding of the concept of truth: “The old and famous question with which the logicians were to be driven into a corner . . . is this: What is truth? The nominal definition of truth namely, that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed.”3 94 Albrecht Wellmer 2. If one wanted to reformulate what Aristotle and Kant said in an easier and somewhat schematic format, one could do so as follows: (T) the assertion, (statement or conviction), that p, is true if and only if p. And this biconditional is then in formal semantics reduced to the following schema: (TI ) “p” is true if and only if p. The problem that concerns us emerges in both formulations: on the one hand, in both cases the “truth condition”—whether the assertion that p, or of the sentence “p”—is formulated with the help of the same sentence for which or for whose assertion the necessary and sufficient condition for being true is sought—such that we, so it seems, don’t at all go beyond the sentence “p,” or rather the assertion that p. But on the other hand, both biconditionals should explain truth as a relation of agreement between a statement (a conviction) and reality, such that the expression “p” would thus have to emerge on the left and right sides as differentiated functions: on the left side it is a question of the statement (assertion, conviction) that p; on the right side, juxtaposed to this, is the “state of affairs” that p. Nevertheless , it is of course no coincidence that we can specify the “fact” with which the statement (conviction) that p should “agree,” again, only with the help of the same sentence “p” with whose help the statement was also made (or the conviction formulated). Next we ask: how can we ascertain whether such an agreement exists between an assertion and a “thing”—a state of affairs, reality? Let us assume that someone claims “both doors are closed.” I turn around and determine that no, both doors are not closed. It is not the case, as it was asserted. Or in another situation, I determine yes, both doors are closed. It is the case, as was asserted. In both cases, therefore, I determine whether the assertion agrees with reality by determining whether it is the case, as was asserted. The precondition for this is that I understand the sentence “both doors are closed,” that I know to what the expression “both doors” refers in this case, and that I can correctly use the predicate “is closed.” If these preconditions are given, I can determine, as a rule—if I find myself in an adequate position—whether the doors are closed. My ability to determine whether the two doors are closed is my ability to determine whether the assertion that both doors are closed agrees with reality (whether it is the case as asserted)—and this means: whether the assertion is true. [54.81.185.66] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 02:50 GMT) The Debate about Truth 95 What “agreement” between a statement and reality means can thus only be clarified when we reflect on our ability to find out in many cases—for instance, through perception—whether things are as asserted. And if we have learned a language, we can do this in many elementary cases. Naturally, things are much more complicated when speaking of logically-complex moral, aesthetic, mathematical, historical, or philosophical judgments (or statements or convictions). In such cases we cannot persuade ourselves, as a rule, merely by...