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Together, Metaphysics Books VIII and IX develop a dynamic economy of principles capable of responding to the question that reveals itself at the end of Book VII concerning the ontological grounds of the composite. A passage found at the end of Book VIII suggests the contours of this new economy: “each individual is something one, and that which is in potency and that which is in actuality are somehow (po\s) one.”1 These rather perplexing words point already to the investigation into the various meanings of potency and actuality, dunamis and energeia, found in Book IX. Yet the claim that dunamis and energeia somehow—pos—exist as one appears only after Aristotle has clarified the qualified manner in which form and matter exist separately from the composite. Taken together, this clarification of the meaning of separation and the thematization of the ontological grounds of the composite in terms of energeia and dunamis constitute two stages of a unified ontological strategy. In a preliminary manner, this strategy can be seen as an attempt to negotiate a third way between the oppositions expressed in the two aporiae outlined in chapter 4. There the question arose as to whether ousia should be understood as either universal or singular and, in a related problem, whether or not it should be understood to exist in strict separation from the being of which it is the ousia. The either/or dichotomy of these two aporiae obfuscates the identification of a safe passage. Aristotle locates a path between these extremes by deploying a strategy that (1) clarifies the equivocal meaning of the tode ti and separation as they apply to form, matter, and the composite and (2) translates the grounding moments of the composite—form and matter—into the more dynamic vocabulary of energeia and dunamis, respectively. Taken together, these two strategic moves constitute Aristotle’s most sophisticated attempt to think the dynamic identity of the composite. Insofar as he succeeds in this, 85 6 The Dynamic Economy of Principles Aristotle’s engagement with finite ousiai lends insight into the present attempt to rethink the nature and function of ontological principles, for here Aristotle develops an economy of principles in which the dimension of domination, although always operational, never eclipses that of incipience. THE FIRST STAGE: CLARIFYING THE MEANING OF TODE TI AND SEPARATION In Metaphysics VII.3, Aristotle had established the two fundamental features of an ousia: “for to be separable (to cho\riston) and a this (tode ti) is thought to belong most of all to an ousia.”2 Although in VII.3 Aristotle had simply posited these dimensions of ousia as fundamental, in Book VIII he clarifies precisely how these terms apply to form, matter, and the composite, respectively . What emerges, however, is a vocabulary of equivocation that allows each of the three in its own way to qualify as a tode ti and separable. This sort of equivocation is typical of Aristotle. It is symptomatic of his willingness to draw out shades of meaning and multiple answers depending on the nature of the phenomenon with which he is concerned. This frustrates those who approach Aristotle’s thinking as a system of thought intent on establishing the definitive, univocal answer to the question of being. To relax the strict conception of to cho\riston is not, contrary to what some have suggested , to engage in an intellectual “cheat” or a “sophistical dodge.”3 Rather, it is to introduce flexibility into an approach that has proven itself too rigid to account for order while affirming the ultimate autarchy of sensible ousiai. In order to appreciate the subtlety and sophistication of this development, it is necessary first to introduce the equivocal meaning of the term tode ti, for once this term is unpacked in all of its complexity, the impetus behind the relaxing of the strict meaning of separability comes into focus. Far from being an intellectual cheat, the equivocation concerning the tode ti and to cho\riston indicates the elasticity of Aristotle’s thinking. It suggests the extent to which Aristotle is prepared to revise even his most basic assumptions in the face of their philosophical inadequacy. The Equivocal Meaning of Tode ti The precise translation of “tode ti” has been a topic of much debate for many years. However, the translation is, as all translations are, only meaningful when situated within the context of the thinking in which it finds expression. Frede and Patzig translate “tode ti” as “Dieses von der Art,” literally...

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