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Between The Incoherence of the Philosophers and The Incoherence of the Incoherence Much has been said about the debate between Ghazål• and Ibn Rushd, or between the Incoherence of the Philosophers and the Incoherence of the Incoherence . My concern is not merely with the details of the debate, although some crucial moments of it are accounted for in this chapter. Rather it is about introducing the debate in such a manner as to highlight the significant role that the notion of the Limit plays in it. In this sense, this chapter continues the same strategy adopted in the previous chapter by revealing the paradoxical development in the thought of the parties involved in the debate, as the notion of the Limit becomes the locus of the evolution of this development. Ab¥ Óåmid al-Ghazål• (d. 1111) lived in a time in which Islamic philosophical and theological traditions had reached a very advanced stage. He wrote an autobiography1 in which he described his struggle with skepticism on his way to liberation from the shackles of both theology and philosophy by means of mystical knowledge. It is believed that Ghazål• wrote The Incoherence of the Philosophers in this period of skepticism.2 Ghazål•’s attitude toward theology seems to be marked by a certain ambivalence. On the one hand, he launched his attacks on the philosophers in The Incoherence of the Philosophers on the basis of theological assumptions. On the other hand, however, he believed that engaging in theological disputations engenders controversy and results in a loss of morality.3 The same ambivalence surrounds his attitude toward philosophy, as careful readers of The Incoherence of the Philosophers can sense beneath the surface of his attack on philosophy the great passion that he had for philosophical CHAPTER 3 ♦ Ibn Rushd versus al-Ghazål• on the Eternity of the World polemic. Oliver Leaman has appropriately characterized Ghazål•’s relationship with philosophy as a love-hate relationship.4 Moreover, as William Chittick states, Ghazål•’s objection was not to the sort of training of the mind that philosophers advocated but to certain conclusions that they reached.5 Ghazål• was described by Ibn Rushd as a man who “adhered to no one doctrine in his books but was an Ash>arite with the Ash>arites, a Í¥f• with the Í¥f•s and a philosopher with the philosophers.”6 He was also described by Ibn ˇufayl (d. 1184) as a man whose works “bind in one place and loose in another.”7 Ibn ˇufayl expresses his wonder at Ghazål•’s providing an apology for his inconsistent practice, saying, “If my words have done no more than to shake you in the faith of your fathers, that would have been reason enough to write them. For he who does not doubt does not look; and he who does not look will not see, but must remain in blindness and confusion.”8 To shake the believer in the faith of his fathers was what Ghazål• set out to do in The Incoherence of the Philosophers , declaring that his objective was to alert those who think well of the philosophers. Thus, he insists that in his argument with them he does not claim and affirm but only demands and denies.9 Ghazål• plays the role of the skeptic, who concerns himself solely with revealing the contradictions in the position of the philosophers. It is a fact, however, that he wrote his Incoherence as a theologian affirming theological convictions. Hence, Van Den Bergh’s characterization of Ghazål• as a great dogmatist is appropriate.10 Nevertheless, as Michael Marmura explains, when Ghazål• argues on the basis of theological assumptions in The Incoherence of the Philosophers, he does this as part of his polemic to refute, and does not attempt to develop in a positive way a theological system.11 Ibn Rushd believed that exposing the untutored masses to theoretical discussions runs the risk of undermining their religious faith and generating conflict instead of harmony in the community. At the same time, he considered it a transgression to withhold theoretical discussions from philosophers-to-be. Thus he was, on the one hand, reluctant to respond to Ghazål•’s Incoherence, regarding most of its arguments as merely dialectical and as devoid of demonstrative truth. On the other hand, however, he found it mandatory to defend philosophy against Ghazål•’s attack. In doing so, he was working with great caution...

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