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During the latter part of the 1970s, U.S. space advocates had predicted that the following decade would see spaceflight becoming “routine,” with NASA’s new space shuttle making as many as 40 or 50 flights per year. Although the STS itself came nowhere near achieving this goal (the actual number of flights in 1989, for example, was six), it can be argued that in another, perhaps more meaningful, way space technology did make major strides toward a sort of “routinization.” As this chapter will show, for the first time since the 1960s, space technology played a significant role in a number of “conventional” areas of government policymaking during the 1980s. In other words, spaceflight was transformed—that is, redefined—from an end in itself (or as a path to “future benefits”) into a mechanism for achieving other policy ends. It is therefore quite likely that the 1980s will be remembered as a major turning point in the history of space exploration, possibly as important a decade as the 1960s. This was due in large part to a convergence of two very different, but ultimately intertwined, series of events. First, space technology itself had matured to the point where, while not exactly as “routine” as aeronautic or marine transport, it had become more fully integrated into the American civilian economy. Put another way, many aspects of space operations now no longer needed to be performed exclusively by NASA (or even by government, for that matter). Moreover, it appeared that a number of space applications, such as rocket launching, remote 115 7 Space Policy Redefined (Again) sensing, and perhaps even space-based materials processing were on the verge of following communication satellites (which had been commercially viable for many years) into the marketplace. Second, the U.S. political scene experienced a profound change. The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 (and, to a lesser extent, the takeover of the Senate by the Republican Party) brought to power in Washington a new group of policymakers who sought to remake virtually every federal policy and program. In particular, these men and women had very definite ideas about using space technologies to attain these ends. The result was, by the end of the Reagan presidency, a very different approach to space policy and a lot of questions for NASA, many of which have still not been answered. Ronald Reagan, Conservatism, and R&D There is a strong tendency among political scientists and historians to portray the Reagan presidency as being uniquely monolithic in its outlook. Some, for example, describe his administration as being the most “ideological” since Franklin Roosevelt’s,1 or “the most explicitly pro-business . . . since the 1920s.”2 In fact, Reagan’s government, like those examined in previous chapters, had its fair share of differences over goals, priorities, and approaches to governing, even among those personally loyal to the president. Since (as the discussion below and in chapter 8 will show) these divisions were to be a factor in the administration’s approach to space policy, it will be useful to explore them—and their sources—in some detail. Internal Policy Differences To begin with, it is a great oversimplification to refer to the Reagan presidency simply as “conservative” with no further elaboration. Like most political philosophies, modern conservatism comes in a number of varieties.3 The supplyside theories that guided much of Reagan’s economic policies, for example, were not universally accepted by “traditional” conservative economists.4 Similarly, the so-called religious right does not have the same set of priorities or approach to policymaking as do free market libertarians. Second, the Republican Party during the 1980s, although certainly “conservative ” in its overall makeup, represented a coalition of somewhat diverse—and, in some cases, contradictory—interests,5 including at various times traditional Republicans , social and religious conservatives, and the group of southern whites and northern blue-collar workers who came to be known as “Reagan Democrats.”6 In addition , one of the more significant—and least remarked on—additions to the Reagan coalition was an unusually unified business community. Although often seen as exclusively Republican in their sympathies, business interests have, in most postwar elections, given support to candidates from both parties (so that they will continue to have access regardless of the outcome). In 1980, however, virtually all business interests lined up behind one candidate: Ronald Reagan.7 While this coalition was highly successful from an electoral standpoint, winning two national elections by 116 DEFINING NASA [3.21...

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