In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Immortal mortals, mortal immortals, living their death and dying their life. —Heraclitus Why should we not call madness death, seeing that by it mind dies, the noblest part of us? —Philo READERS OF PLATO’S dialogues would recognize a constantly renewed desire to define philosophy and to distinguish it from sophistry, rhetoric, poetry, etc.1 One suspects that this attempt to delimit philosophy as a discourse is itself what philosophizing is. In Plato, reflexivity is already inscribed into the nature of philosophical activity. The Phaedo and the Phaedrus are two of Plato’s dialogues where philosophical activity is presented as a questioning of what philosophy is. In the Phaedo, Plato claims that philosophy is a practice for dying and death, whereas in the Phaedrus philosophy is described as a kind of madness. Through these two characterizations of philosophy, Plato determines the subsequent attempts to think philosophy, as well as to think philosophically about the themes of madness and death. After Plato, madness and death become deeply connected to the way in which philosophy interprets itself. Therefore, to the extent that philosophy is considered to be, among other things, the activity of asking what philosophy is, madness and death emerge as two themes that can help us understand this activity. To say that philosophy is an activity of asking what philosophy itself is does not suggest 13 ONE Plato Death and Madness in the Phaedo and Phaedrus that all philosophical activity explicitly asks this question. Historically, the question of what philosophy is has not always been explicitly posed. However , every philosophical questioning does in fact bring together an implicit understanding of what philosophy is. Martin Heidegger expresses this conviction in What is Philosophy?2 and “What is Metaphysics?”3 These two works not only connect the question of what philosophy is to philosophical activity itself, but also articulate this activity in terms of a certain engagement.4 Philosophy, according to Heidegger, is a question of a fundamental attunement (Stimmung) where philosophy “concerns us, touches us in our very nature.”5 In “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger expresses the same conviction in terms of metaphysical questions: “. . . every metaphysical question can be asked only in such a way that the questioner as such is also there within the question, that is, is placed in question.”6 Plato shares the conviction that philosophy is a matter of engagement. In the Phaedo this engagement is characterized in terms of death.7 Socrates states that Evenus, who is otherwise indistinguishable from a philosopher, ought to follow him to death if he (Evenus) is a real philosopher. Yet Evenus’s alleged unwillingness to do this “surprises” Socrates and leads him to question whether Evenus is actually a philosopher. Evenus is only believed to be a philosopher. Is there a criterion to distinguish a philosopher from a sophist? It seems that philosophy and sophistry speak about the same thing to a large extent. What distinguishes philosophical activity is an engagement with not only what is said, but also with that which speaks to us. The response to being (ousia) is a response to what a moment presents. Yet what is philosophical activity as opposed to sophistry? Where does philosophy begin? What, if any, is the mark of the moment where philosophy is not a matter of content, but a desire for engagement?8 At this point one must not simply ask the historical question as to when philosophy started, or who the first philosopher was. Even when we raise this historical question we realize that our answer depends upon the way in which we understand what philosophy is. Hence, the question of the beginning of philosophy is itself a philosophical question, not only because beginning is a philosophical problem, but also because we need to raise the question of what philosophy is, that is, the philosophical question of ti to estin? (what is . . . ?). We often take it for granted that the philosophical (rather than the historical) beginning of philosophy is wonder (thaumazein).9 Yet we must emphasize that wonder is not the origin of philosophy in the sense of a beginning, which is left behind. In What is Philosophy?, Heidegger claims that arche is both the beginning and the principle of (that which rules) philosophy .10 Hence, thaumazein is not simply the mood one is in before starting to philosophize, but it is an attunement between the questioner and the world. In this sense of the word “beginning,” there are in fact multiple beginnings of philosophy, and perhaps wonder...

Share