The Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inonu and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950

Chapter Three: War at Home, War Abroad: New Terms of Domination

Chapter Three War at Home, War Abroad: New Terms of Domination In a world dominated by powerful states, to what extent can a less powerful state determine its own terms of participation in war? If it wants to remain at peace, but still confronts the belief in the rationality of conflict, what is the impact of its non-belligerency on its foreign and domestic relations ? When the German war effort turned toward the West in May 1940, Turkish statesmen were facing these questions regarding the rationality of Turkey’s participation in the European conflict, and were searching for an answer to the question of how much autonomyTurkey had in matters of war and peace. As I . smet I . nönü pointed out in the fall of 1940: Since last year there has been no change in the foreign policy of the Republican government. The foremost reason for this is that our foreign policy holds independence in policy and the protection of our entire citizenry to be fundamental, and it is in no way connected to greedy ambitions .…No state, if it does not have hostile intentions, can criticize us…or be anxious about our policy, which seeks only to protect our rights.1 While Turkish policy was formulated around these ideas, which I . nönü expressed time and again, the great powers all tried to include Turkey in their own equations for victory in the war. In the period from June 1940 to July 1942, Turkish foreign policy was one of caution, aimed at maintaining a balance between the warring sides that would allow continued non-belligerency. Events tested the resolve of Turkish policy makers, and made them realize that the key to survival was not only balance and caution , but also obtaining and retaining autonomy in Turkish foreign affairs. 55 56 THE POLITICS OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY Maintaining autonomy required preparation and caution, which I . nönü, reflecting on his experience at the Lausanne Conference, believed to be a vital part of Turkish foreign policy. This chapter, by concentrating on the period from June 1940 to July 1942, examines the impact of the early years of the war on Turkish foreign and domestic affairs. While Turkish foreign policy reflected Turkey’s struggle for autonomy in the turmoil in Europe, domestic policy in this period centered on the state’s efforts at organization and control of economic activity and political expression. As the heavy demands of foreign affairs shook the concentration of the administration on domestic affairs, calls from policy makers for sacrifice, effort, cooperation, and patience within the country began to meet with protest and disapproval from the people. Yet the question remained: what was the price of non-belligerency in terms of economic development, relations with the Western powers, freedom of speech, and democratic principles? The War in Europe, Diplomatic Obligations, and Military Preparedness Following the German attack through the Low Countries into France in May 1940, and after Italy’s subsequent declaration of war in June, the Allies called on Turkey to fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of October 1939. The question was whether when Italy declared war, did Turkey’s obligation to render “all assistance within its power” to the Allies mean Turkey’s entrance into the war? The British and the French Ambassadors called on Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu to urge theTurkish government to execute the treaty by immediately cutting diplomatic relations with Italy, but not Germany. They also called on Turkey to begin general mobilization and to place naval and air bases in Turkey at the disposal of the Allies. They suggested that when ready, the Turkish government would declare war on Italy.2 The Turkish reply did not come immediately. Saraçoğlu had been receiving regular reports from the Turkish Ambassador in France as well as from reporters who had visited the western front in May. Their reports had been consistently gloomy and full of the most dire predictions of impending disaster for the Allies. Furthermore, members of the parliamentary group of the People’s Party split on the question of whether or not to enter the war in Europe. Refik Şevket I . nce and the retired General Refet Bele were among those who favored entering the war. Recep Peker, one of the architects of the National Defense Law, argued that Turkey was automatically at war, and could not risk delay in honoring...