The Function of Theory in Composition Studies

Notes

Notes Chapter One. The Current State of Composition Theory 1. See Miller, Assuming the Positions. 2. See Writing and Difference, Of Grammatology, Margins of Philosophy, and Dissemination. 3. See Dasenbrock, Herzberg, Juncker, Smit’s “Rhetorical Method,” and de Beaugrande. 4. See, for example, Barton and Charney. Chapter Two. The Discourse of Knowledge in Composition Theory 1. Rorty cites what he calls “Locke’s confusion” as another crucial step in the emergence of philosophy-as-epistemology. While Descartes had devised the notion of mind that would serve as epistemology’s field of study, Locke tried to mark the operational boundaries of that mind. According to Rorty, Locke saw a relation between “a mechanistic account of the operations of our mind and the ‘grounding’ of our claims to knowledge” (140). That is, he confused an explanation for the development of a belief with the justification of that belief, as if an understanding of how things work also offered an explanation of why they did so. This occurred, according to Rorty, because Locke saw knowledge “as a relation between persons and objects rather than persons and propositions” (142). In such a scenario, propositions—the statements we make about the relation between persons and objects—are representative rather than constitutive, and the work of epistemology is to get at the “essence” of 101 that relation through the necessary and hopefully transparent medium of language. Rorty sees Locke not only confusing two separate issues, but doing so for no apparent reason. That is, it is not clear why in the first place one would be led to confuse the formulation of a belief with its justification. But, according to Rorty, this inexplicable situation points to the very problem of epistemology: it seeks rational answers to quasitheological questions. 2. In addition to Scott’s “On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic,” see the following, among others: Carleton, “What is Rhetorical Knowledge?”; Cherwitz, “Rhetoric as ‘A Way of Knowing’ ”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Rhetorical Perspectivism” and “Toward a Rhetorical Epistemology”; Farrell, “Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory”; Gregg, “Rhetoric and Knowing”; Leff, “In Search of Ariadne’s Thread”; Scott, “On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later,” “On Not Defining ‘Rhetoric,’ ” “Non-Discipline as a Remedy for Rhetoric?” and “Rhetoric is Epistemic: What Difference Does that Make?” In addition, see the “Forum” section of Vol. 76 (1990) of the Quarterly Journal of Speech, subtitled “The Reported Demise of Epistemic Rhetoric”, which contains contributions from Barry Brummett, Cherwitz and Hikins, and Farrell. See also the Vol. 80 (1994) “Forum,” subtitled “Reflections on a Nietzschean Turn in Rhetorical Theory: Rhetoric Without Epistemology?” in which Douglas Thomas responds to a previously published article by Whitson and Poulakos titled “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric,” which I in turn discuss below. 3. See Berlin’s overview of epistemic rhetoric in Rhetoric and Reality. 4. Also implicit in both composition’s and communication studies’ discussions of epistemic rhetoric are assumptions about knowledge that, if examined, should lead compositionists to question the need for assenting or adhering to an epistemic rhetoric at all. The ongoing discussions in philosophy that examine the nature, conditions, and limits of knowledge have been taken into account by few in either field. Even a glance at recent work in this area of philosophy indicates that inquiry into the nature and origins of knowledge is a complex endeavor. For one thing, few explicitly identify knowledge with Cartesian certainty anymore, and the traditional definition of’knowledge as justified true belief has been complicated, extended, and even refuted. In light of this complexity, it should become evident that reducing the question of knowledge to neat and unexamined formulations does little 102 Notes to Chapter 2 to further any theoretical explanations of rhetoric or writing. Furthermore , Richard Rorty’s provocative argument that philosophy’s epistemological imperative is historically specific rather than intellectually perennial, and that such an imperative depends on the assertion of a clear distinction between the interior space of the mind and the exterior space of the world, should suggest to compositionists that the entire epistemic enterprise, complex and varied as it is, rests on assumptions that, as rhetoricians, they might find unwarranted. 5. In addition to Neel’s crucial book, see Crowley’s A Teacher’s Introduction to Deconstruction and Atkins and Michael L. Johnson’s Writing and Reading Differently. On a smaller scale, a few others in the field have tackled the subject...