Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being

Conclusion

CONCLUSION There is much that remains unsaid in this book. It is by no means comprehensive , and the ongoing project of publishing Heidegger’s Collected Works means that there will be still other texts than those considered here that will add new material, as well as amplications of some of the more innovative aspects of Heidgger’s interpretation that are sometimes only cryptically presented in the currently available literature. Especially important is a text that I have only considered in passing here, since it was only recently published, his 1924 course, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy . This course offers an extensive treatment of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which Heidegger reads in conjunction with a treatment of hexis and moral virtue in the Nichomachean Ethics. The analysis of pathos there is important for an understanding of the decisive sections on mood in Being and Time, and gives further evidence to my claim that Heidegger sees Aristotle’s practical philosophy as an ontology of human Dasein. In the end, perhaps there is need for critical assessment, for another book that would offer more evaluation of Heidegger’s interpretation than I have provided. It is after all important for a philosopher to attain some distance from the author he or she is studying. In retrospect I appreciate this point, but I also believe that a genuine encounter with the thought of Heidegger can only be based on a careful presentation and understanding, and this attempt has proved formidable in its own right. While the voice of the author is always present in the text, I have tried not to infuse the reading of Heidegger that I have presented with an agenda of my own that would interfere with the analysis rather than support it. At the same time, I have tried to avoid proselytizing, preferring instead to expose the work of Heidegger and let it speak for itself. There is an interpretative strategy that I did bring to this work, however. I tried to set up an encounter between Heidegger’s reading and the text of Aristotle, to situate Heidegger’s claims in a broader context of passages from Aristotle, so that the legitimacy of conclusion 189 • Heidegger’s interpretation could be judged on the basis of a return to the texts of Aristotle. I believe this was the motivating principle and goal of many of Heidegger’s readings, and it provides the appropriate basis for a critical discussion of his interpretation. Although I consistently return to the thematic focus of the book, the twofoldness of being, I think this theme in the end remains underdeveloped , and it is my hope that it provides a starting point for further study. It is especially important to return to this topic on the basis of what has been presented here, and to take up the question of the implications of this theme as a question for philosophy. Granted the claim that for Aristotle being is twofold, how is this twofoldness to be understood and what might one learn from it about the meaning of being? There is no doubt that this task for thinking was the gift that Heidegger received from Aristotle, and that spurred Heidegger onto his own philosophical path. Heidegger takes up in particular the issue of time and the finitude of being, and the issue of ster¯esis, nonbeing, in addressing these questions as projects. The central topic that pervades Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle, and the one above all others that demonstrates his knowedge and insight, is the topic of kin¯esis. For Heidegger the problem of movement and the question of the ontological character of moving beings was the fundamental question of Aristotle’s philosophy. Aristotle’s metaphysics entered into this basic aporia that governed the experience of being in ancient Greece, the difficulty of thinking of the being of motion, the denial of ontological kin¯esis. He was able to grasp, on the basis of this question, the meaning of being and thereby to bring to its end the philosophical struggle of his times. The ensuing history of philosophy is the witness to his accomplishment. In our time, called by some the time of the end of metaphysics, we are once again required to return to the beginning, not out of what some consider to be a Heideggerian nostalgia for the Greeks, but to stand once again prepared for a new beginning. ...