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increases following a string of “tails.”Other examples of inferential error include the common error of placing too much weight on personal experiences or anecdotal evidence. No good reason exists for barring the incorporation of such psychological mechanisms into situational models to explain belief formation once explanations guided by the rationality principle have been exhausted. ELST ER’S MODEL OF REVOLU T IONS One of the attractive features of situational analysis is its ability to generate models of social situations that transcend idiography, even if such models never attain the explanatory power of a universal theory. These models are capable of shedding light on a variety of social phenomena though they generate no real predictive power. We have already discussed some examples of situational models that hover somewhere between mere description and general theories.These include Popper’s analysis of the “inner contradictions”of Communist parties, Marx’s analysis of trade cycles, Plato’s explanation of dictatorial power, and Michels’s “iron law of oligarchy.” But what would a situational model that relied upon the rationality principle but that also incorporated psychological phenomena look like? A good example of such a model is Elster’s explanation of political revolutions (Elster 1993, 15–24).9 Elster describes his explanation, which he says was inspired by reflection upon actual revolutions (especially the French Revolution and the revolutions in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s), as a “dynamics of revolution ” that relies upon “applied political psychology” (Elster 1993; 15). He tells us that in developing the explanation, he began by describing “the situation potential revolutionaries find themselves in, and their motives” (Elster 1993, 16; my italics). In a footnote, he expands further on his methodology: To explain a given phenomenon, the actors are initially assumed to have rational, self-interested motivations. If their behavior cannot be explained on this minimal basis, altruistic (although still rational) motivations are introduced . If the explanation is still inadequate, nonrational motives are admitted. In the last case, it is important to indicate the specific kind of irrationality we have in mind. Using the irrational as a residual category merely names the problem without solving it. (Elster 1993, 19 n. 41) This prescription, it should be obvious, closely resembles the revision of situational analysis that I proposed in the previous section: Begin with the assumption of rationality and a preliminary description of the situation encountered by the relevant actors. Hold fast to the rationality assumption until potential explanations relying on it are exhausted.Only after that point has been reached, seek psychological mechanisms that might explain apparently irrational behavior . However, Elster in the above citation draws two analytic distinctions that Popper does not make. First, Elster marks a distinction between rational and nonrational behavior that is not present in Popperian situational analysis. For THE SHORTCOMINGS OF SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 113 Elster, only instrumental behavior counts as rational behavior, whereas Popper’s rationality principle counts noninstrumental, norm-guided behavior as within the bounds of rationality. Elster, in contrast, dubs norm-driven behavior as “nonrational,” as distinguished from rational or irrational behavior. However, the distinction appears to be nominal. Elster and Popper both agree that norms provide a type of motivation to action that cannot be reduced to instrumental calculation, and they agree that norm-guided behavior should not be considered a kind of irrational behavior. For both thinkers, genuine irrationality occurs when a person’s actions are contrary to their beliefs and goals. Second, unlike Popper, Elster distinguishes between self-interested instrumental behavior and altruistic instrumental behavior. However, here he is simply claiming that it is useful to begin with the assumption of self-interested instrumental behavior. There is no presumption that self-interested behavior is somehow more rational than altruistic behavior. According to Elster, what is the situation that revolutionaries confront? It can initially be described as a classic free-rider dilemma. A successful revolution would secure a public good—that is, the benefits flowing from a regime change would accrue to most citizens and could not be denied those who had not risked anything to overthrow the old regime. Thus, at first glance, it appears that it would not be rational to participate in revolutionary agitation, just as it would not be rational, from the standpoint of “thick” rational choice theory discussed in chapter 4, to vote in democratic elections. But revolutions do occur from time to time, so we obviously need to pursue the explanation further. “If all else failed,” says Elster, “we could account...

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