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of dual citizenship; in this regard, they can lend insight into the challenge of negotiating the movement between private and political that all of us, in a deeply pluralistic society, must face to some extent.10 For example, a religious student can demonstrate a valuable lesson to her classmates as she thoughtfully engages with ethical difference—even acknowledging the reasonableness of some positions in conflict with her own deeply held religious -ethical framework. Such a model can demonstrate the vital distinction between the civic realm (where she gives full expression to her private ethical framework) and its political subrealm (where she demonstrates willingness to compromise as reciprocity and the burdens of judgment require). While a dual commitment to religion and civic virtue can provide an inspiring example to others, we should not underestimate what public life in an ethically diverse society requires of us. Some religious creeds will violate the norm of reasonableness required for political coercion, and any argument that seeks to involve religious perspectives more fully in political deliberation must contend with that inevitability. Certainly there will be citizens who refuse to honor reciprocity and accept the burdens of judgment , relying solely on tactical politics. As I acknowledged at the outset of this section, the language of reasonable political deliberation is not neutral. Students—religious and otherwise—need to learn to recognize the limits that reasonableness places on their deliberation, but do so in the context of genuine respect and understanding of religious and other ethical frameworks . This entails students learning not only about standards of reasonableness , but developing a civic commitment to abiding by them in political decisions even when they diverge from their own visions of the good life. FALLIBILISM AND ETHICAL ADHERENCE Acceptance of the burdens of judgment—as a necessary component of political deliberation—involves the acknowledgment that one’s ethical framework is one of multiple reasonable possibilities. Here, religious believers who hold a strongly exclusivist, fundamentalist perspective toward matters of belief and interpretation will likely object. Asking students to concede this, they would claim, encourages a fallibilism about their beliefs that is unacceptable: it threatens the stability of their faith and questions the very authority of their god. It is vital here to understand the nature and degree of fallibilism required for acceptance of the burdens of judgment. If by fallibilism we 112 Grappling with the Good mean an approach that continually calls into question one’s most fundamental , metaphysical beliefs, then such a “strong” fallibilism is not necessary for civic virtue. Rather, students should be willing—in light of reasonable disagreement—to revisit their application of core ethical beliefs to civic matters. This willingness does not preclude acting upon one’s convictions for fear that one’s civic judgments might possibly change, nor does it mean insisting that all such perspectives are held only provisionally . Such a “weak” fallibilism will not satisfy all religious adherents, of course, but it does provide more room for religious-ethical frameworks than some might fear. To begin with, a student who recognizes the reasonableness of ethical perspectives different from her own is not thereby compelled to withdraw (or even soften) her assertions and convictions about the truth of her own framework. In accepting the burdens of judgment, Charles Larmore contends, We need not suspend judgment about the correctness of our own views. We may still rightfully believe that, despite being controversial, they are better supported by experience and reflection than those of our opponents . This is because we can recognize that a view is reasonable, yet false: it may have been arrived at sincerely and in accord with generally accepted forms of reasoning, yet against the background of existing beliefs that our own viewpoints judge as false.11 Here we return to the student-friendly phrase, “Reasonable doesn’t mean right.” If we neglect to make this distinction between reasonableness and truth, we are faced with a version of fallibilism that requires us to view even our deepest convictions as tentative. This is asking too much, and not only of fundamentalist religious adherents; it seems more than a little deceptive (perhaps toward oneself, but certainly toward others) to claim that I am willing to call into question even my deepest ethical convictions whenever I am presented with differing perspectives. In this sense, I depart significantly from some advocates of interreligious dialogue who contend that genuine dialogue requires us to hold our entire ethical framework open to revision. Teachers need not—and should not— endorse such a...

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