The Failures of American and European Climate Policy: International Norms, Domestic Politics, and Unachievable Commitments

CHAPTER SIX Rhetoric and Reality: The United States vs. the World? (Kyoto to Marrakech)

CHAPTER SIX Rhetoric and Reality: The United States vs. the World? (Kyoto to Marrakech) The signing of the Kyoto Protocol was a high point of international action to address climate change. In the weeks after the Kyoto conference, nearly all of the major industrial states retreated from the commitments contained in the Protocol. None of them directly challenged the headline emission reduction commitments. However, the United States and its allies made it clear that they would demand very liberal rules for sink credits and the maximum use of flexibility mechanisms to minimize the need for domestic emission reductions. While the EU opposed the American tactics, most member states were also in retreat from their earlier commitments. The pre-Kyoto EU burden sharing agreement committed member states to achieve aggregate emission reductions of 10 percent (across three GHGs). The Kyoto Protocol reduced the EU’s commitment to an 8 percent emission reduction (across six GHGs). The easing of the EU commitment produced a scramble among member states to secure reductions in their commitments. Even Germany secured a decrease in its EU emission reduction commitment from 25 percent to 21 percent. The parties to the Kyoto Protocol appeared to be having second thoughts about their commitments and the domestic emission reductions they could require. The post-Kyoto negotiations can be divided into two periods. The period from Kyoto to the 2000 COP 6 meeting at The Hague produced intense negotiations over sinks and flexibility mechanisms that pitted the European Union against the United States and its allies. It was apparent that the United States was unlikely to achieve significant emission reductions and would need to rely on sinks and flexibility mechanisms to meet its commitment . Germany and the EU argued that the United States was creating loopholes to avoid domestic action and continued to appeal to a norm requiring domestic emission reductions before countries resorted to the flexibility mechanisms. International climate norms achieved greater levels 163 164 THE FAILURES OF AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CLIMATE POLICY of domestic political salience in Germany and the United Kingdom after Kyoto. Both countries used their Kyoto commitments to justify controversial domestic policy changes. In particular, both countries launched new energy taxes to fund reductions in taxes on labor. However, Germany continued to rely primarily on emission reductions from restructuring in the East, and the United Kingdom continued to depend on emission reductions from fuel switching to meet its target. While the negotiations leading up to The Hague were contentious, the participants believed that an agreement was achievable and that the Kyoto Protocol could be ratified and enter into force in the near future. However, the remarkable failure of The Hague negotiations and the election of George W. Bush in 2000 launched a new phase in the negotiations. The period from The Hague failure to the Marrakech negotiations in the fall of 2001 produced a new dynamic. The Bush administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol as unfair and potentially devastating to the American economy. The American rejection forced the other states to decide whether to scrap the Protocol and pursue new negotiations or proceed without the United States in the hope that it would eventually return to the Protocol. Germany and the EU led the effort to complete the Protocol. The Protocol required ratification by fifty-five countries representing 55 percent of developed country CO2 emissions. For Kyoto to enter into force without the United States, it would be necessary for the EU plus Russia and Japan to ratify the agreement .1 After The Hague, the negotiations focused on EU efforts to offer sufficient incentives to Russia and Japan to ratify the Protocol. Domestic policy became a less important issue. The focus was on achieving a ratifiable agreement. The headline commitments would remain the same, but behind the scenes the states would eviscerate the agreement with various loopholes that minimized domestic emission reductions and undermined the norms that underpinned the Protocol. UNITED STATES The conclusion of the Kyoto negotiations changed little in the American climate policy debate. The Protocol contained no new commitments for developing countries, which remained a fundamental requirement for Senate ratification. Public apathy, industrial hostility, and congressional opposition combined to undermine meaningful attempts to reduce domestic emissions. Unless there was a dramatic shift in the domestic political situation, the United States would have to rely extensively on the flexibility mechanisms and liberal accounting standards for sinks to meet its Kyoto commitment. The post-Kyoto negotiations were thus critical to...