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Chapter 2 ____________________________ Transparency and Conflict “If states knew with certainty that other states sought only to be secure, they could refrain from attacking each other and be perfectly secure.... Democracies are particularly good at dispelling uncertainty and...this fosters peace.” —Political scientist Andrew Kydd1 “Uncertainty...is threatening itself.” —Psychologist Reginald Adams2 Uncertainty is dangerous, according to the conventional wisdom regarding international politics. Uncertainty about how others could use their military power leads states to regard all power as a potential threat, regardless of who bears that power. This makes states perpetually insecure and leads them to spend money on guns rather than on butter, diverting scarce resources away from other needs.3 Military spending, reciprocated by equally nervous societies, encourages arms races that make no one more secure and sometimes escalate to war. Uncertainty also leads states to make poor or counterproductive decisions. Inaccurate estimates of relative military strength lead states to initiate wars they will lose. Ill-informed states misperceive their neighbors ’ intentions and inadvertently provoke wars. Conflicts of interest escalate to violence when states fail to recognize mutually acceptable solutions short of war. Fear that others will cheat prevents states from forming agreements such as arms control treaties that could make them more secure. Though nations willingly enter conflicts when threats are real, they do so needlessly when conflicts result from misperception, 23 miscalculation, or uncertainty about the motivations of other states. Such unwanted conflicts should be the easiest to prevent. The hope for transparency is that increased knowledge and international understanding will help states to prevent unnecessary wars and to devote their resources to more productive causes. Greater transparency should reduce—though not eliminate—international uncertainty by providing states with more and better information about the intentions, capabilities, and priorities of other states. This information, in turn, should reduce misperceptions (defined as false interpretations of information) and miscalculations (defined as plans based on misperceptions). A lack of information is certainly not the only reason for misperceptions and miscalculations, but misguided views are harder to maintain in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Unfortunately, transparency is a double-edged sword. Though transparency does reduce uncertainty, less uncertainty will not always mean more security or peace. Rather, the effects of greater transparency depend on what it shows and how states react. We cannot assume that transparency will show behavior that supports peace and cooperation or that states will react to information in ways that will lead to a more just or peaceful world. Greater transparency can indeed enhance international peace and security if it shows that other states are genuinely peace-loving, but transparency can make conflicts worse if it illuminates hostility, aggression, or arms buildups. By illuminating weakness, transparency can undermine deterrence and encourage aggression. It can alert states to closing windows of opportunities and give them incentives to fight. By taking away strategic ambiguity, transparency can encourage states to find less visible, more pernicious means of defending their interests. This chapter explores the role of uncertainty in international politics and the complex implications of greater transparency for international security, conflict resolution, and security cooperation. It argues that greater transparency can be a mixed blessing. This view contrasts with prevailing opinion, which assumes that decreasing uncertainty will reveal information that enhances international cooperation and security. That outcome is possible, but not assured. Uncertainty, Security, and Conflict The lack of a world government to protect states from acts of violence, and to enforce agreements between them, means that states must protect their own interests and citizens.4 In this environment, states are perpetually insecure. Uncertainty about how other states will use their power in the future means that all power is a potential threat. States, therefore, 24 The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency [18.119.111.9] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 10:47 GMT) build military strength and maintain standing armies even in the absence of direct threats to their security. Paradoxically, building military strength may actually make states less secure. Even though a state may arm only to defend itself and its interests, other states cannot be certain of this motivation. To be on the safe side, those states arm in response, creating a spiral of suspicion and insecurity even when none of the parties has aggressive intentions.5 This “security dilemma” is a rational, if unfortunate, side effect of an international system in which states must protect their own security and interests . States can try to avoid this dilemma by predicting which...

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