Democratizing Technology: Andrew Feenberg's Critical Theory of Technology

1. Rethinking Modernity as the Construction of Technological Systems

CHAPTER ONE DAVID J. STUMP Rethinking Modernity as the Construction of Technological Systems Introduction Andrew Feenberg has carved out a unique and philosophically productive position in the philosophy of technology that is informed by both the essentialist philosophy of technology developed by Heidegger and the Frankfurt School, and by various social historical accounts of science and technology such as those developed Weibe Bijker, T. P. Hughes, and Bruno Latour.1 These two schools of thought are not easily integrated, for although they share technology as a major subject of their study, their central understandings of the relationship between technology and society contradict one another. This chapter will focus on what philosophers of technology should learn from the social historians of technology and will argue that a full acceptance of the view of the social historians of technology will improve the position of critiques of technology. Feenberg’s merging of the philosophy of technology and science studies gives rise to questions about the concept of modernity, since modernity is characterized by the development of technology. Max Weber’s analysis of modernity is crucial to understanding the debate between various Frankfurt School writers on the philosophy of technology because all of them adopted Weber’s view that modernity is defined 4 Theoretical Assumptions of a Critical Theory of Technology| by differentiation—the fragmentation of the world into autonomous “spheres of value” such as the political sphere, the economic sphere, etc. Since each of these spheres operates independently and according to its own aims, methods, and logic, each can advance unimpeded by “external influences.” The autonomous development of science and technology in the industrial age and of the economy in capitalist free markets is emblematic of modernity and is the prime examples of its progress. However, this same autonomy of the spheres implies that our technological processes are “meaningless,” since they stand outside of any unifying worldview and, even worse, are out of our control due precisely to their autonomy. In the hands of experts who follow only the internal logic of technological development , technology is a dominating force rather than a tool that we can control and use for our benefit, since it is beyond the reach of political action or other forces that are independent of its own logic. Even advocates of modernity such as Habermas think that because technology is natural, it is in some sense unquestionable. One cannot be against science or technology since it is part of human nature to seek knowledge and to use things as means to human ends.2 Feenberg rejects this technological determinism, referring to social constructivist accounts of technology to make his case. Social constructivist accounts question the distinctive autonomy or differentiation of spheres in modernity by pointing out with historical case studies that there is always a mixture of technical, political, economic, and other social concerns in the development of technology, not just technological imperatives. The autonomy of technology seems to be nothing but a myth from this point of view, since social and political factors always influence decisions made in technology and science. Indeed, the central aim of the social constructivist histories of science and technology is to prove that there are always social and political dimensions of technology. The philosophy of technology of both antitechnological writers such as Heidegger and pro-Enlightenment writers such as Habermas are undercut by social histories of science and technology, Heidegger’s because his essentialism fails to account for either the historical development of technology or the intersection of technology with economic, social, and political concerns.3 Habermas’s fix for the Enlightenment project, the governance of the lifeworld by a communicative rationality that is independent of and sheltered from technical rationality, is also shown to be untenable by the social constructivist histories of science and technology. Habermas accepts the autonomy of technical rationality in a limited role running the system, while maintaining the democratic aspirations of the Enlightenment by underscoring the role of communicative reason in the lifeworld and in providing legitimization for the political order, but the very distinctions that are supposed to save the stump Rethinking Modernity 5|| modern picture have been called into question, as has Weber’s definition of modernity itself.4 Far from limiting philosophical critique of technology, however, social constructivist accounts can be understood as proof that technology is open to criticism and to change. With examples developed in several of...