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Chapter 3 Intellect and Being 3.1 PLOTINUS’ THEORY OF INTELLECT Plotinus’ theory of Intellect (Nους) is one of the most original concepts of Greek philosophy.1 It links Plotinus’ Neoplatonic philosophy not only with the philosophy of Middle-Platonism and especially with Numenius and Albinus ,2 but also with the original Presocratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian tradition . As Armstrong states: “It is the fullest expression in his system of the universal later Hellenic belief in a totally unified cosmic order.”3 Plotinus’ innovation lies in integrating into one concept (1) Plato’s world of Forms, (2) the Middle Platonic idea of the Forms as thoughts of God, (3) the Aristotelian theory of the self-thinking God, and (4) Parmenides’ theory of Being.4 Fundamentally , it is a synthesis of Plato’s theory of the Forms in the Phaedo, the Timaeus, the Parmenides, the Sophist, and especially the middle books of the Republic with Aristotle’s account of the divine mind as a pure thinker in Metaphysics and of the active intellect in De Anima. In this framework, Plotinus ’ Intellect is a unified organism of intelligibles, a revealing unity-inplurality of the Forms self-produced through the eternal generation of the One. As H. J. Blumenthal puts it, Intellect’s thinking is ‘a thinking of proper intellectual objects, namely, its own contents, thereby amalgamating the highest principles of both Plato and Aristotle in the highest form of existence in Plotinus’ system.”5 With regard to Plato, Plotinus accepts the Forms as true and eternal living intelligences with their own substantial content. In the light of Plato’s teaching, Plotinus connects his Nους with the “all-complete ever-living being ” of the Timaeus (29d7–47e2), with the “true being” endowed with life and intelligence of the Sophist (248e–249a), and with the second hypothesis in the second part of the Parmenides (137c–142a, 144e5; 155e5).6 Following Plato’s Sophist, Plotinus regards the Forms not as self-subsistent universals but as living intelligible beings. This is due to the identification of Intellect with its Being in the Forms (V.1.4.26–9), and of individual Forms with individual intellects (V.9.8.3–7); each Form is both the object and the subject of intellection.7 On this basis, Intellect becomes a self-contained all-complete world of active intelligibles where every intelligible is not only “actually itself,” but also “potentially ” all the others (VI.2.20; III.8.8.40 ff.). ˘ ˘ 59 With regard to Aristotle, Plotinus’ theory of Intellect seems to be influenced by the Aristotelian thesis of the “self-thinking” divine activity in Metaphysics (1074b34: νο } ησις νοη } σεως). At the divine level, the object of intelligence is identified with the intellectualizing subject and this selfintellectualization is the essence of God’s perfect life; and since life is the actuality of thought, and God is that actuality, then God’s eternal, self-dependent actuality is the best life (1072b26–29). The attributes of the Aristotelian God in Metaphysics then are eternity, immutability, indivisibility, imperceptibility, and self-sufficiency, constituting a divine nature that is supreme, pure actuality in thinking-itself (1072b18–21). The divine identity of thought and its object appears again in De Anima 431a1: “actual knowledge is identical with its object .” For Aristotle, this identity is the purest form of thought, appearing only at the level of the immaterial intelligibles. As he explains at 430a3–4: “in the case of the immaterial objects [the intelligibles], that which thinks and that which is being thought are the same.”8 Based on these considerations, Plotinus’ theory of Intellect has to be regarded as a departure from Plato’s original theory: the Platonic Forms now become substantially active forces which constitute the divine Intellect “boiling over with life” (VI.5.12.9: υ ο } ριστος) until, at the phase of Reversion, it delimits itself (ο τυ } πωτος ο % ψις), at the phase of Reversion the Intellect contemplates the One in actuality and becomes a complete “actualized vision” (ι >δουσα ο % ψις). In the metaphysical context, while at the stage of Procession, Intellect receives an immediate apprehension of the One; it actually becomes Intellect only in the phase of Reversion. In the light of this assumption, Plotinus identifies Intellect’s Procession with the controversial but fundamental concept of Indefinite Dyad (V.1.5.14: α > ο } ριστος δυα } ς), or Intelligible Matter (II.4.5: νοητη { υ &λη).11 This concept of Indefinite Dyad has its roots both in Plato’s Philebus (23c1 ff.), and in Aristotle ’s Metaphysics Z (1035a9, 1037a4), and H (1045a34, 36). But...

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