Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite

1. Beyond Being and Intelligibility

CHAPTER ONE BEYOND BEING AND INTELLIGIBILITY In recent decades there has been a surge of interest in “negative theology,”1 of which Dionysius is a leading exponent, and hence many studies of this feature of Dionysius’ thought.2 Rarely, however, do such studies attempt to present the philosophical argumentation that underlies his teachings. The doctrine that God or the One, the first principle of reality, lies beyond being and beyond thought, for Dionysius and his Neoplatonic forebears, is not an ungrounded starting point or an article of faith but rather the conclusion of a rigorous sequence of philosophical reasoning, and only by following this argumentation can we truly understand the doctrine’s meaning. Neoplatonic and Dionysian “negative theology” and “mysticism” is an aspect of rational metaphysics, and must be interpreted and evaluated as such. The aim of the present chapter, therefore, is to expose the philosophical grounds and meaning of Dionysius’ negative theology by showing how the argument behind it is developed in the Greek philosophical tradition that Dionysius draws on and continues. The foundational principle of Neoplatonic thought is the doctrine that to be is to be intelligible. The identification of being, t¿ ∫n, that which is, as that which can be apprehended by n¬hsiV, intellection, is the basis not only for the Platonic and Neoplatonic identification of being as form or idea (eΔdoV, Îd°a), and the associated view that the sensible is less than completely real, but also for the Neoplatonic insistence that the One or Good, the source of reality, is itself “beyond being.” To arrive at a philosophical understanding of Dionysius’ doctrines of being and of God, therefore, we must begin by examining the meaning and grounds of this principle, and then see how its implications are unfolded in Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy. The idea of being as intelligible is implicit in Greek philosophy from the very beginning. The philosophical enterprise, insofar as it is an endeavor to think reality as one whole, always already presupposes that being as such is able to be grasped by thought. This presupposition is first made explicit by 5 6 THEOPHANY Parmenides: “For you could not know that which is not, for it is impossible, nor express it; for the same thing is for thinking and for being [o®te gΩr œn gno√hV t¬ ge m‹ ÷¬n (o¶ gΩr ™nust¬n)/o®te frásaiV. T¿ gΩr a¶t¿ noeƒn ⁄stin te ka¥ ei ’`nai].”3 Parmenides indicates here, first, that thought is always the apprehension of some being. For whatever is thought is necessarily thought as something, i.e. as some being. T¿ m‹ ÷¬n, that which is not, cannot be thought, for to think absolute non-being would be to have no object or content for thought, to be not thinking anything, and hence not to be thinking. We may recall here the Thomistic principle, derived at long remove from this Parmenidean insight: “Being falls first in the conception of intellect . . . Wherefore being is the proper object of intellect [Primo autem in conceptione intellectus cadit ens . . . Unde ens est proprium objectum intellectus].”4 Whatever is thought is thought most basically and generically as some being, which may then be specified by various determinations. Second, Parmenides in this passage affirms that being extends no further than that which can be apprehended by thought, that there cannot be anything beyond the reach of thought. It would be incoherent even to postulate an unintelligible being, a being that cannot be thought, for to do so would already be to think such a being. Parmenides’ fragment thus brings to light the obvious but vital point that to think being, that which is, at all, is already to presuppose its intelligibility . To think being is to think it as thinkable. Indeed, it follows not merely that being and intelligibility are coextensive, as Parmenides plainly asserts, but that intelligibility is the very meaning of being: by being we can only mean “what is there for thought,” for since thought cannot extend to anything else, “anything else” is mere empty noise—in short, nothing (t¬ m‹ ÷¬n). If ‘being,’ “that which is” considered as one whole, has any meaning at all, then it necessarily means “that which is available for thinking,” i.e. that which is intelligible. That which is, then, is (wholly and solely) that which can be apprehended by intellection, and intellection is (wholly and solely) the apprehension of that which is. Plato’s understanding...