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Chapter 3. Free Will
- State University of New York Press
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Chapter 3 Free Will T he most important practical issue that flows from the view of mind and body relationship is that of free will. If we are physiologically determined so that the mind is a mere epiphenomenon—the mind is a product of brain activity but has no control over it—then free will is an illusion. Chapter 2 showed that James rejected the materialist view that would make free will an illusion and presented a view of reality and of the human person that makes it possible for human beings to take an active role in their own lives rather than that of a spectator. This chapter will look specifically at the issue of free will as James presented it and comment on how his ideas stand today. The question of free will stands out as one of the most concrete and practical that anyone can ask. The question may be framed like this: “Can I, by effort, make the rest of my life significantly different from what it would be without that effort?” We can ignore the question when we are in the flow of things. When we are doing what we want to be doing, the question of free will does not impose itself, just as we ordinarily do not think about breathing unless we are having trouble breathing. But the question of free will becomes immensely important during crises in our life, whether they are caused by events closing in, or ourselves growing out. A theory of free will that flows in harmony with James’s pragmatic theory of meaning must have practical consequences . In what follows, I will show that the theory of free will can serve as both a motivator and a program for becoming more free. Psychology and the Subjective Experience of Free Will In his Principles of Psychology,1 James begins his analysis with the ideomotor theory of behavior. Every state of mind connects to some bodily 21 behavior. States of mind necessarily lead to action; for example, the sight of food will lead a hungry person to reach for it; the sight of a dangerous object such as a speeding car will cause him to jump up on the curb. As I am sitting at my computer working on these thoughts, I can look away from my monitor and see the lamp, the books, the pictures, and the window, and I anticipate a challenge to this theory. These visual ideas fill my mind, but they do not lead to any action. But then I look back at the monitor and at my notes, and I resume writing. The idea of writing about James and his theory of free will persists as the idea that prevails in my mind at the present, and it calls for some action on my part. The simple relation of mental states to action does not constitute voluntary action. States of mind often lead to actions, which are merely reflexive such as brushing away a fly as soon as we become aware of it. Other actions may be compulsive escapes, such as paging through an old magazine when we become bored. The discussion of free will obviously requires more than just connecting action to a state of mind. James defined an act of the will as the desire for some end that we believe to be in our power to achieve. Desires for ends that we do not consider attainable, remain mere wishes. At first glance this definition seems to fall short. A person often desires things that he believes lie within reach but does not will them. For example, I may wish to stop writing so that I can watch a football game on TV, but I will to keep writing. James explains this apparent difficulty by the description of inhibitions. If we desire two things that are incompatible, each inhibits the other. Sometimes the desire to write effectively inhibits the desire to watch a football game and sometimes the reverse happens. A person with only one desire would follow it inevitably. But since most of us have a plethora of conflicting desires, we follow only those that have the upper hand over their opponents. Muscular movement constitutes the point of contact between our conscious states and our effect in the real world. These movements constitute the only immediate experience of an outward effect of our will. James argued that consciousness always acts impulsively, or inhibitively, that is, it tends to produce or restrain muscular...