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4 The Quasi-Reflective Life Inadequate Ends Inadequate ends are ends that are in need of revision in order for them to be legitimate or moral ends. Unless we are fully conscious of what our ends are and how they fit into a larger moral context, they could be inadequate. As long as we do not deliberately challenge, discuss, debate, and deliberate over ends, they could be inadequate. We have to carry on a moral dialolgue about these ends. Dialogue is a philosophical conversation that differs from all others. Dialogue is an exchange of ideas among those who consider themselves to be colleagues. Needless to say, given the military’s rank structure, dialogue is a difficult form of communication to achieve within the war machine. As long as we are not fully aware of the relationship that ends should have with the means employed to reach those ends, they could be inadequate. In chapter 3 I argued that ends are not sufficiently coordinated with means. In this chapter I will argue that means are only dubiously connected to ends; in fact the moral nature of the means are often overshadowed or even ignored in the pursuit of the end. Operation Iraqi Freedom exemplifies both errors when it comes to means and ends: means becomes ends and ends eclipse means. I will bring up several real-world examples. I use these examples in part because they are more interesting than imaginary examples. I find that using real examples in the classroom is much more stimulating than trying to come to grips with a hypothetical example such as Bernard Williams’ case of Jim and the Indians.1 I want to remind the reader that I am not generalizing from those examples. The examples are logical and practical consequences of an inadequate theoretical understanding. In addition, I am not merely making a descriptive account of the state of moral awareness, understanding, and 105 action of the military. In addition to the description, I am making normative judgments not only about what we are actually doing, but also in many cases about what we should do. After looking at some examples of moral error brought about by inadequate ends, I will continue the critique of the inadequate relationship between ends and means followed by an examination of the presumed nature of these ends and the need to deliberate over new ends. The military should refine its pursuit of these inadequate ends, for they have led to moral error and are in need of revision because the value of these ends eclipses the value of the means; the ends are presumed and are either dubious or unjustified; and there is no adequate deliberation over new ends. INADEQUATE ENDS AND MORAL ERROR So, what is wrong with the military thinking that its end should be victory? Douglas MacArthur reminded the cadets at West Point that their “mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable—it is to win our wars.”2 Within a few years after hearing MacArthur’s words at West Point in 1962, these cadets found themselves embroiled in a conflict in Vietnam, and they did their best to do what they had been told. They did the best they could to win, at least militarily. The military actually did win, at the tactical level, in the skirmishes , engagements, and battles. Colonel (Ret.) Harry Summers recounts his anguish at coming to realize a great irony about hollow victories: “‘You know you never beat us on the battlefield,’ I told my NVA counterpart in Hanoi five days before the fall of Saigon. ‘That may be so,’ he replied, ‘but it is also irrelevant.’”3 The great irony is that “winning all of the battles, as General Charles Cornwallis’ experiences in an earlier revolution should have alerted, does not guarantee winning the war.”4 Summers argues for strategic victory in addition to tactical victory. A further irony beyond the fact that tactical military victory may not win the war is that winning the war strategically may not be enough, either. Military victory has been neither a sufficient nor even a necessary condition for success at the political level in the history of conflict since the Age of Battles. The officers who were young during Vietnam were in charge of the military during Desert Storm. They were determined not to have any more hollow victories. Indeed, Desert Storm was supposed to be the model for getting this victory business right.5 This time the conflict would have a clear military...

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