Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin

4. The Yarmouk, 1967–1994

4 The Yarmouk, 1967–1994 The Yarmouk River and not the upper Jordan became the focal point of the Jordan River basin riparian dispute during the post–1967 War period. In the June 1967 Middle East War, Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. Besides these geopolitical changes, important hydropolitical modification also occurred. Through its control of the West Bank, Israel took command of the West Bank aquifers that supply one-third of Israel’s freshwater. With the control of the Golan Heights, Israel gained control of most of the upper Jordan River and expanded its rule of the Yarmouk River’s northern bank; however, Syria continued to command most of the Yarmouk’s headwaters (see Map 4-1).1 Israel, rather than Syria, was now across the river from the East Ghor Canal intake, a critical source for Jordan’s irrigation system.2 Because of these geopolitical changes, Arab water disputes with Israel were no longer a high political issue and, subsequently, Jordan’s preference not to participate in tactical functional cooperation with Israel mellowed in the post–1967 War period. By November 1967, Syria and Lebanon acknowledged their suspension of the diversion projects for technical and financial reasons, and Jordan began to allow a portion of the Yarmouk to flow to Israeli pumps.3 This chapter focuses on why cooperation and agreements occurred and endured between Israel and Jordan, and Jordan and Syria, while, at other times, coordination of water resources did not take place. This chapter will also consider why water scarcity nearly precipitated violent conflict five different times between Israel and Jordan in the midst of their secret watersharing regime, yet peace was maintained. While the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict continued, limited water-related cooperation carried on between 93 Israel and Jordan for sharing the Yarmouk water, which assisted both of them in developing their agricultural sector. In addition, Syria and Jordan were able to cooperate at times on issues such as the Maqarin and Unity (al-Wahdah ) Dam projects. Syria and Israel, however, never cooperated over water resources. These different outcomes tell us something about the conditions necessary to build tactical functional cooperation, be it numbers of players or potential for future cooperation. As discussed in chapter 1, tactical functional cooperation is an arrangement of water-related rules between states, in this instance, Jordan and Israel, that prescribe roles, constrain activities, and shape expectations. Tactical functional cooperation also provides critical information, reduces transaction costs, establishes focal points for coordination , and facilitates reciprocity. However, in a protracted conflict where trust 94 The Yarmouk, 1967–1994 Source: US State Department. MAP 4-1 Yarmouk Basin, Post-1967 is lacking and water-sharing rules are poorly defined, tactical functional cooperation is difficult to achieve, and misunderstandings and cheating may lead to violent conflict. Therefore, third party involvement, such as that of the United States, may be beneficial when the third party pushes the sides to better define the tactical functional cooperation rules and to comply with them. In addition, this process of creating rules and compliance leads to new ideas on addressing water scarcity and positive personal relationship among technocrats and elites, which is necessary for improving overall political relations. The first section of this chapter examines the issues linked to the Yarmouk water resources of its riparians: Jordan, Syria, and Israel. The next part explains the value of Jordan Valley agricultural development and the importance of its political stability for Jordan and Israel. That section also analyzes the strengthening of Israel and Jordan’s relationship due to their balancing of the Syrian and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) threat. The third section reviews the difficult negotiations over building the Maqarin Dam on the upper Yarmouk in the late 1970s, and why dyad cooperation occurred but triad cooperation failed there. Around the same time, secret tactical functional cooperation between Israel and Jordan developed, and a Jordan -Israeli community of technocrats emerged, as described in the fourth section . In the mid-1980s, Yarmouk water scarcity and noncooperative actions by Israel and Jordan precipitated a mobilizing of troops and heavy arms to the Yarmouk that could have led to violent conflict but did not. The next section reviews the late 1980s negotiations on the Unity Dam, which, like the Maqarin, was an upstream Yarmouk facility that in the end was not completed during this period. The final section discusses...