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7 Conclusion This chapter summarizes the results of this study’s investigation into what leads states in a protracted conflict to cooperate or to compete over scarce water resources. By examining contemporary international security, environmental studies, and US foreign policy literature, this book identifies several prominent debates and arguments that help explain how states in a protracted conflict behave in relation to scarce water resources. This chapter offers answers to the questions posed in chapter 1, includes a summary of the analysis contained in chapters 2 through 6 relating to TFC (tactical functional cooperation), third party involvement, domestic institutions , hegemonic stability theory, and acute conflict, and also marshals the book’s defining arguments. It concludes by outlining the lessons that third parties , as well as Jordan riparians, may draw from these results. TACTICAL FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION This section discusses the effectiveness of tactical functional cooperation, addressing: (1) what are the components of TFC that make it effective in maintaining cooperative efforts? (2) does TFC have peacemaking value? Once cooperation has been initiated, riparians are able to maintain it through TFC. As with formal and informal institutions, TFC plays a critical role in managing cooperative efforts between states. Without the establishment of rules and the means to reciprocate, the evidence suggests that coordination would have been short-lived. As reviewed next, TFC also facilitates the exchange of information, lengthens the shadow of the future, and provides an avenue to continue issue linkage. 201 Altering the payoff structure assumes an important role in TFC when third parties such as the United States provide incentives to maintain cooperative efforts and penalize cheating. Without TFC, a focal point for third party action is absent with no means to judge whether participating parties play by the rules. While the Johnston mission failed to secure a signed agreement, for example, the Johnston Plan and subsequent secret notes between the United States and Jordan, as well as the United States and Israel, did provide the parties an important framework within which to cooperate (see chapter 3). American officials believed that the Johnston Plan was fair and realistic and that subsequent Israeli and Jordanian waterworks were within the rules of the plan. At first, the Johnston Plan led to disagreements over certain provisions for sharing water. Because the protracted conflict was ongoing and certain rules not clearly defined, TFC was initially difficult to achieve, and on a few occasions misunderstandings and cheating nearly led to violent conflict between Israel and Jordan. In 1979, 1986, and 1987, Israel and Jordan mobilized troops on the Yarmouk’s banks because of disputes over water allocations and scarcity. As the Yarmouk forum rules became well established, though, and confidence and transparency increased, the parties gauged the flow on a biweekly basis, jointly cleaned the riverbed annually, and exchanged technical data on river flows. Both sides built a reputation of reliability and good will through solving the problems and addressing the needs of the other riparian. As a result, the participating states (Jordan and Israel in this case study) came to understand that cheating was not to their advantage. This example shows that, beyond the benefit of better water management, TFC also offers an opportunity for improved conflict management. In this instance, neither state wanted a conflict over water, and TFC became the best means available for realizing their mutual preferences. The fifteen-year process of TFC provided additional nonmaterial benefits of building confidence, trust, and a better understanding of the other side’s water problems. Because Jordan and Israel worked together during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to manage their water scarcity problem, each state achieved an important common understanding not only of its own problems, but also of the difficulties experienced by its rival. This process helped move Jordanians and Israelis from seeing each other as faceless enemies to regarding each other as good partners who had similar water problems. With TFC comes new ideas to solve common problems. If the sides had not met and discussed their common difficulties, it is doubtful that they would have had the stimulus and information needed to look for new ideas for solving old water-sharing problems. Lengthening the shadow of the future has two important results relative to TFC. First, as discussed in chapter 1, it decreases the temptation to cheat because participants understand that cheating today would draw sanctions tomorrow and cooperation at present would bring benefits in the near and dis202 Conclusion [3.144.212.145] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 18...

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