The Case for Decentralized Federalism

CHAPTER 4 Beyond Centralization: How to Liberate Federalism?

93 Introduction Bargains reached between accountable politicians o en include elements that reflect their accountabilities. In Canada, that has meant, in a fashion u erly indicative of our multinational history, demographics and geography, that federalism was not simply optional for the shaping of a Canadian body politic, but in reality, the only option. Federalism was the critical means by which conflicting interests were reconciled and the potential for future con- flicts managed through a system of smaller units, pooling some powers in the centre while leaving vital powers with the pre-Confederation local governments. Without that confederal trade-off between what remains decentralized and what is placed in the central administration’s purview, there would have been no Canada. It remains the critical a raction of federalism in contemporary times. As Ron Wa s, one of the world’s most eminent scholars in comparative federalism recently pointed out: …more and more peoples have come to see some form of federalism, combining a shared government for speci- fied common purposes with autonomous action by constitutional units of government for purposes related to maintaining their regional distinctiveness as allowing the Chapter 4 Beyond Centralization: How to Liberate Federalism? Hugh D. Segal 94 Hugh D. Segal closest institutional approximation to the multi-national reality of the contemporary world (Wa s 1999: 4). This balance with respect to where powers of government are exercised is fundamental to the way Canada came together in the 19th century and remains viable in the 21st century and beyond. Clearly, the role of federalism as a manager of conflicting interests, as the critical instrument for reconciling local and geopolitical differences across the country was key to the creation and survival of Canada itself. At the same time, that central and ongoing dynamic role should absolutely make us all very, very wary of efforts to impose new overarching institutions or powers that dilute the decentralized character of Canada as a federation where, as a defining characteristic, there is at least as much explicit paramountcy between jurisdictions in designated areas under the Constitution ―areas vital to facilitating how Canada itself was founded, as to anything else. And whatever the case one might make, not without justification for strong national institutions, it is vital not to assume that national programs and federal government institutions are one and the same. To accept that the definition of ‘national’ would be, at a stroke, to deny the extent to which clearly compelling ‘national’ realities, like health insurance, car licence portability, the administration of justice under one criminal code, the way financial institutions like banks, credit unions, co-ops, trust companies and insurance enterprises, are actually governed and environmental protection or health and safety inspections really transpire. All are made real by different levels of government discharging their respective jurisdictions under Sections 91 and 92 of the Canadian Constitution. And while various assessments of the pre-Confederation debates accurately represent what the different views were, at the time of the polemic between centralized and decentralized organizational options, the hard truth of the final core agreement is undeniable. Perhaps the most prominent of Quebec’s premiers put it clearly and succinctly: Beyond Centralization 95 …Confederation is made of provincial authorities within the scope of their jurisdiction and a sovereign central authority within the scope of its jurisdiction. When Confederation was discussed and decided upon, it was based on the principle of complete provincial autonomy (Duplessis 1950: 7). Duplessis’ view has prevailed for all subsequent Quebec premiers, of all political affiliations. This never however, stood in the way of decentralized authorities or the provinces working together with provincial counterparts to achieve appropriate national goals around issues like portability. The reason that an amalgam of provincial and federal, or decentralized and centralized, can produce what is truly ‘national’more efficiently than the federal government on its own, even with endless pots of money, is in no way unclear. The reason is the vital capacity of federalism and decentralized powers within a constitution to manage and maximize the benefits of diversity. Diversity is not only a good thing. In its complexity, it can be about barriers to effective program design and delivery that can frustrate even the most compelling of public policy goals. As Canada becomes more multi-ethnic and pluralist over time, as the core duality of the English-French foundational confederal...