In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Twelve MACINTRYE OR GEWIRTH? VIRTUE, RIGHTS, AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL INDETERMINACY Gregory J. Walters Within the history of Western ethics, we find both the teleological approach, exemplified by Aristotle's ethics of virtues, and the deontological approach, heralded by Kant's ethics of duty, rule-utilitarianism, and divine will/command conceptions of morality. Usually, we assume that these two approaches are incompatible and we must follow either the "good" or the "right."1 In this essay, I am concerned with what I believe is the most significant contemporary manifestation of the virtue-rights debate. Alasdair Maclntyre's work in virtue ethics is now well known, but rarely discussed is Maclntyre's critique of Alan Gewirth's theory of morality as a theory of human rights.2 This is puzzling since Maclntyre admits that Gewirth represents the most sophisticated attempt to lay the foundations of a theory of human rights in a systematic analysis of the rational basis of morality. If Gewirth fails to provide adequate grounds for rejecting the emotivist and subjectivist accounts of morality that Maclntyre finds so prevalent today, then Maclntyre has strong evidence to conclude that other Kantian deontologists, such as John Rawls, Alan Donegan, and Bernard Gert, will not succeed either. Maclntyre's singling out Gewirth from among this eminent group of scholars would warrant the focus of this essay, but more is at stake in Maclntyre's critique of Gewirth. Maclntyre's critique raises the central and perennial question of how best to rationally justify moral theory. If Maclntyre is right and Gewirth wrong, then nothing less is at stake than the possibility of construing the difference between moral right and wrong as objectively knowable and universal for all persons who claim to use rational methods of reflection. If Gewirth is right and Maclntyre wrong, at stake is the problem of moral indeterminacy in virtue ethics and a rethinking of the role of human rights in contemporary moral theory. The Maclntyre-Gewirth debate raises fundamental questions about moral justification, ethical universalism, the determinacy of substantive moral norms, and the proper role of rights, responsibilities, and community in contemporary ethical theory. My first business in this essay is to identify why Maclntyre believes the Enlightenment project of justifying morality failed, given its operative moral suppositions, and to highlight the implications for Gewirth's human rights theory. Second, I identify four key elements of Maclntyre's critique of Gewirth. Third, I 184 Gregory J. Walters present Gewirth's rebuttal to Maclntyre based on his argument to the "Principle of Generic Consistency" (PGC). Fourth, I highlight aspects of the moral indeterminacy , which Gewirth maintains plagues Maclntyre's virtue ethics. Finally, I ask: How are we to evaluate this debate, and what conclusions should we draw from it for Christian ethics? 1. The Failure of the Enlightenment Project and the New Teleology Maclntyre's central thesis is that the moral projects of Kierkegaard, Kant, and Hume failed. However different their respective philosophical accents on choice, reason, and passion, their projects had to fail because they inherited a moral scheme whose internal incoherence guaranteed failure from the outset. The inherited scheme entailed both a certain view of human nature and a set of moral principles, rules, and injunctions divorced from their earlier teleological context. The pre-Enlightenment moral scheme, essentially derived from Aristotle, turned on three hinges: a conception of "untutored" human nature; a conception of the precepts of rational ethics or of divine law; and a conception of "human-nature-asit -could-be-if-it-realized-its-te/os."3 The third element dropped out of the moral horizon just prior to and during the Enlightenment period, and requires reference to the other two dimensions if its status and function are to be intelligible. In the classical scheme, ethics is understood as a "science" that enables persons to move from raw nature to a nature realized in accordance with its essentially relational end. The precepts of rational ethics are constituted by different virtues and vices, which correct, improve, and educate the subject about how to move from human potentiality to action. To ignore the role of the virtues and vices in the moral life is to land ourselves in frustration, to miss the mark with respect to the good of rational happiness, a telos unique to the human species as such. Aquinas, Maimonides, and Ibn Roschd appropriated the classical scheme within their respective theistic frameworks, but did not essentially alter it. They brought teleology and deontology, virtue and...

Share