U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror

3. Doctrine for Army Operations

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'/&+Å'/*+ The American soldier today is a part of a great machine which we call military organization; a machine in which, as by electrical converters, the policy of government is transformed into the strategy of the general, into the tactics of the field and to the action of the man behind the gun.—Elihu Root, Marquette Club address, Chicago, Illinois, 7 October 1899 Even as the 1904 doctrine was attaining government approval, pressing national affairs were conspiring to ensure the content, direction, and purpose of future editions would be altered. By January 1899, the War Department oversaw the administration and security of overseas possessions acquired from the recent conflict with Spain. Having just witnessed the Army’s bureaucracy struggle to mobilize the service for an overseas war, President William McKinley realized that War Department reorganization was necessary to support an army of occupation. On 20 July 1899, the reform-minded McKinley offered Elihu Root the position of secretary of war. A lawyer by discipline and without military experience, Root assumed office on 1 August 1899. He had much to contemplate , notwithstanding the War Department’s performance during the recent War with Spain. Army generals now governed Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the subjugated areas of the Philippines, an area measuring just over 10,100 miles from San Juan to Manila. The regular Army consisted of 100,000 men with 66 percent of them overseas; several thousand volunteers augmented them. In total, nearly 30,000 army troops were either already engaged in combat or deploying to join in the fray.1 Secretary Root quickly determined that conflict with Spain had created new roles and missions for the Army. Decades of frontier duty had 108 : CHAPTER THREE resulted in an outpost system with small army garrisons scattered about the country. The commanding general of the Army held a titular rather than authoritative position. In actuality, bureau chiefs administered and supplied the Army, bypassing the commanding general to report directly to the secretary of war. Bureau staff officers were accustomed to holding their permanent, highly coveted positions. Many had lost touch with the field force long ago. Bureaucratically, the War Department was caught within a vortex created by its own operational success. Doctrine and the Root Reforms Transformation was not only necessary but urgent, given the new realities of overseas national responsibilities. In addressing Chicago’s Marquette Elihu Root (Credit: U.S. Senate Historical Office) DOCTRINE FOR ARMY OPERATIONS : 109 Club in 1899, the secretary stated his intention in these terms: “The machine [Army] today is defective; it needs improvement; it ought to be improved .” By describing the Army in mechanistic terms, Root conveyed his intent to create an army system. This inclination meant replacing the War Department’s emphasis on individual talent and independent departments with a new philosophy promoting group work.2 War Department reforms soon broadened into a general restructuring of the Army. Doctrine played a role in realizing Root’s vision. Collectively called the “Root Reforms,” two initiatives directly shaped the future course of army doctrine. With congressional support, Root changed the War Department’s organization by supplanting the independent-minded commanding general and bureau chiefs with a general officer “chief of staff” who directed an “army general staff.” Designed to maximize group input in producing war plans and providing the service with the wherewithal to fight, doctrinal development also fell under the purview of the army staff who would function as service caretakers. No less important, in 1904 Root established a progressive hierarchy of army schools encompassing pre-commissioning to senior service: West Point and post schools, the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry (1881), later known as the Infantry and Cavalry School, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, became the Army School of the Line, focusing upon tactics and command and staff functions up to division level. The second-year General Staff School, attended by about 40–60 percent of Leavenworth’s first-year class, was added and stressed large-unit general staffs, operations, and logistics. The two courses consolidated (1923) to become the Command and General Staff School and later the Command and General Staff College (1946). The Army War College (1904) capped off the school hierarchy. A planning division reportable to the general staff was located within...