Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945

Introduction. Assimilation and Space: Toward an Ethnography of Japanese Rule

1 In the fall of 1925, after nearly fifteen years of planning and over five years of construction, the Government-General, the colonial state that had ruled over Korea since its annexation by Japan in 1910, unveiled an imposing Shinto - shrine atop Namsan (literally, South Mountain). Although the mountain had marked the southern edge of Hanyang, the former capital of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910), Namsan was quickly becoming the geographic center of a growing metropolis known in Japanese as Keijo - (Kyŏngsŏng; present-day Seoul), the empire’s showcase city on the peninsula.1 Until its destruction in 1945, Korea Shrine—whose deities (Amaterasu, the mythical ancestress of the Japanese polity, and Emperor Meiji, Japan’s first modern monarch [r. 1868– 1912]) symbolized the ideology of an unbroken imperial line—was one of the most powerful public sites in colonial Korea and one to which millions of residents, from both Keijo - and throughout the peninsula, paid their respects. These visits of worship, compulsory for all ablebodied residents of Keijo - during the Asia-Pacific War (1937–45), formed part of an ambitious project to turn the colonized population into dutiful , and ultimately loyal, subjects of the emperor. However, Koreans remained economically and politically disadvantaged in comparison to most of their privileged Japanese counterparts, exemplified by their relatively low class position and underrepresentation in the higher ranks of administration. Fearing the negative outcomes of such blatant discrimination , Ogasawara Sho -zo -, a Japanese proponent of Shinto -, had introduction Assimilation and Space Toward an Ethnography of Japanese Rule 2 | Introduction tried unsuccessfully to install native deities at Korea Shrine in order to more effectively “assimilate” (tonghwa; J: do -ka) the colonized masses. However, his experience visiting the shrine’s unveiling ceremony on October 15, 1925, demonstrated that assimilation might prove difficult, if not impossible. As he recalled: At approximately eight o’clock in the evening, I left my inn wearing a light, unlined garment and a half-length, Japanese-style coat. Using the front approach, I paid my respects to the gods [J: sampai shita]. Both Japanese and Koreans continually climbed the stone stairs. However, when they arrived in front of the offertory hall, the former removed their hats and bowed, whereas the latter turned around and went home. I stood in front of the offertory hall for more than an hour. But, not one Korean paid his or her respect to the gods. According to our common sense, paying one’s respects to the gods means making a ceremonial bow and offering a prayer. Koreans do not pay their respects before the gods; I could [thus] confirm that they [merely] look around [J: sankan]. What is the cause for this [behavior]? Will Korea Shrine end up being a shrine only for the Japanese?2 The creation of a government shrine atop Namsan aimed at directing the thoughts and actions of the colonized population captures the central premise of this book, namely, that Keijo -’s public spaces are an important, if overlooked, crucible for examining the development of Japanese rule. In this particular case, Shinto - practices of emperor worship functioned as the outward signs by which critical observers like Ogasawara attempted to judge the loyalty of Koreans. Accused of simply “looking around” Namsan, colonized visitors purportedly lacked the reverence attributed to their Japanese counterparts, who, like Ogasawara, respectfully prayed before the newly installed deities of Korea Shrine. This failure of assimilation—a central, albeit vaguely defined, policy of Japanese rule—suggested the need for the colonial state and its proxies to repeatedly examine and train Koreans according to what Michel Foucault once called a “regime of truth.”3 As extant records and subsequent memories of shrine visits demonstrate, many members of the colonized population resented being subjected to intrusive forms of surveillance that grew out of racialized claims that they were inferior. However, with the exception of some Christian protestors for whom emperor worship equated idolatry, most Koreans came to perform the rituals expected of them at this powerful public site, especially after wartime mobilization began in 1937.4 Despite these outward gestures of compliance, Ogasawara’s apprehension also reveals that, at least as of 1925, most of the colonized Introduction | 3 population did not act, let alone think, according to official expectations of reverence. Indeed, forging the critical link between the venerated ancestors of the Japanese imperial house and those of individual Korean clans remained a significant, if...