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Appendix 2. Proclus's Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato, 1.341.25–343.15.
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APPENDIX II Proclus's Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato, 1.341.25-343.15 This translation of a small portion of Proclus's commentary on the Timaeus is indebted at a number of points to A. J. Festugiere's translation of the entire work (see "Works Cited: Ancient Authors"). Jowett's translation of the Timaeus text has been used for the sake of providing standard equivalents for some of the basic terminology. I have italicized repeated key words, giving the original Greek at the first occurrence, and retaining the same translation throughout, even at the expense of awkwardness . The goal is to retain the coherence of Proclus's argument as far as possible. In some cases, italics have been used to indicate the presence of a key term even in instances where there has been a change in the partof speech in the Greek (e.g., permanent = /3e/3cuos [adj.] in line 4, but permanent quality = TO (3s/3aiov [noun] in line 22). The numbers in paren theses indicate the pages of Diehl's edition. we may assume that words [\6yot] are akin to the matter they describe; when they relate to the lasting [^ovifjuov] and permanent [fBefiaiov] and intelligible [/JLETOI vov Karaffraves], they ought to be lasting and unalterable [d/usTairT&iToi] and as far as their KTJTOI]—nothing less" [Plato Tim. 2gb]. Earlier, [Plato] called the model "eternal" [asi 6v} and "unchanging " [Kara ravrd s\ov] and "grasped by intellection" [vor]crei TTeptXr/TTTOi'], and here he calls it "lasting," using that term (341) .an d in speaking of the copy and the model [irapadei-yfjia], (341) (342) nature allows, irrefutable [aveksyKTOi] and invincible [avi- (342) APPENDIX II 313 in place of eternal, "permanent," using that term in place of unchanging , and "intelligible" in place of the other expression, grasped by intellection. As far as the words concerning them are concerned, he calls them lasting in order, by using the same term in both instances, to show their resemblance to the things [Trpdy/xara] they represent; he calls them unalterable so that they will represent the permanent quality of the things, and irrefutable , so that they may imitate that which is grasped by intellection and proceed systematically and wisely [eTrioTTj/UiOviKd)?]. For, if the words are going to be appropriate to intelligibles, they must have the qualities of being highly perfected and closely fitted, since they concern things that have these qualities. For, just as the knowledge [yixucris] of eternal things is unalterable, so also is the word, since it [i.e., the word} is this same knowledge, explicated [avetXiy/ievo?]. And since this word goes forth into plurality, and has a composite nature, and for this reason falls short of the unity and indivisibility of the thing, he calls the thing "lasting" and "permanent" and "intelligible" in the singular but uses plurals to describe the lasting, permanent, and irrefutable words. And, though there is a resemblance between the model and the word, there is also a dissimilarity, and the latter is greater, for only the word "lasting" was applied to both, and otherwise different terms were used. And although the systematic and wise word cannot be refuted in the context of our knowledge —for nothing in us is more powerful than systematic wis- (343) dom—it may be refuted by the thing itself, as being unable to grasp the thing's nature as it is and falling short of its indivisibility , and for this reason Plato added the phrase, "as far as their nature allows." For this systematic wisdom is irrefutable on the level of souls, but mind [vovs] refutes it, for mind alone can express that which is, as it is; systematic wisdom is secondary, and explicates the indivisible and grasps the simple by synthesis. Then, the imagination [(pavTacria] refutes sense impression [aicrflTjcri ?] for the latter knows through experience, by combination and separation, and imagination is free of that. Opinion [86£a] in turn refutes imagination because imagination knows by shape and form, and opinion is above these. And systematic wisdom refutes opinion by knowing independently of causal rea- [54.196.114.118] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 16:52 GMT) 314 APPENDIX II soning, which systematic wisdom has the primary function of confirming. And finally, as has been said, mind refutes systematic wisdom,because the latter, as it proceeds, makes division in the thing known, but mind seizes it in its entirety along with its cause. Only mind, then, is invincible. Systematic wisdom and the word...