Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits

5. The Stakes of Losing Office in Comparison

5 The Stakes of Losing Office in Comparison When a president in a mature democracy with a developed economy complies with a constitution and steps down when required, we can put forward two related explanations for such behavior. If we assume that all politicians are pure office-seekers and only institutional constraints hinder their political ambitions, we will attribute constitutional compliance to the existing checks and balances alone. However, if we allow for the possibility that motivations of political actors are more complex, the behavior of presidents can also be explained if we turn to how these leaders perceive the value of their office and career prospects after departures. Either way, in wealthy democracies most of the time we do not observe any other succession outcomes bar unambiguous departure. Therefore, the strength of checks and balances, and, equally, a possibility of enrichment after leaving office as a private citizen, offer possible explanations for presidents’ behavior. Likewise, in regimes where political leaders face a high value of holding office and low constraints, presidential term limits will often be absent in the first place. Should these restrictions be present, they will often be easily overturned by powerful executives. Such cases are also less illuminating if we attempt to attribute causality unequivocally and trace the causal mechanisms behind constitutional compliance. In fact, given the inherent heterogeneity of causal relationships, especially behind the phenomenon of democratic consolidation, various empirical models that can demonstrate the validity of institutional, or actor-based, or structuralist explanations, are equally possible, as enumerated in the introductory chapter. In order to examine the validity of the proposed argument and to find implications for how the value of holding office influences 121 122 Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits constitutional compliance, I turn to three illustrative cases below. Each of these cases demonstrates, in the language of causal inference, the existence of causal tendencies that show how tenure extensions and “personalization,” or lack thereof, are brought about (Hedstrom 2005, 108). Throughout this chapter I underline that the existing executive constraints — while important — alone cannot provide a complete explanation of presidents’ behavior, and that leaders’ personal motives to remain in office matter at least as much as the existing checks and balances. Admittedly, institutional, international and societal constraints are easier to observe than personal costs and benefits of individual leaders. We cannot know with absolute certainly how political actors perceive the value of their offices. We can however infer this value from reported estimates of the spoils of office, interviews of political actors, indictments, and implemented institutional changes that can be interpreted as driven by leaders’ concerns for personal immunity and wealth. The case of President Milošević (1989–2000) of Serbia and Yugoslavia is the clearest example of how prohibitively high costs of leaving office make the pursuit of that office the only possible option for an incumbent leader. Given the magnitude of rents extracted from the economy by the president’s family, as well as the concerns over criminal prosecution that prior to 1999 had been quite likely, and, following the indictment by the ICTY Tribunal in 1999 — became certain, — irrespective of various constraints on the president’s capacity to act at will, from his own point of view Milošević had no choice but to extend his time in office, which he did successfully in 1997 and attempted to, unsuccessfully, in 2000. In contrast, another president, Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004) of Ukraine, in 2004 attempted to secure the election of his chosen successor, albeit unsuccessfully, and in the process triggered the momentous events which came to be known as the Orange revolution. This case presents several questions in light of the proposed theory. If, as I argued earlier in chapter 4, presidents with valid reasons to worry about their personal immunity are more likely to attempt to remain in office, then why did this leader, who had valid personal concerns, decide to step down? Also, given the existence of such concerns and the fact that his succession plan failed, why the former president was not prosecuted after departure? In some sense, Ukrainian presidential succession of 2004 is a critical case study to examine whether, despite the president’s departure and his immunity intact in private life, it is still possible to demonstrate observable implications of the personal costs and benefits The Stakes of Losing Office in Comparison 123 of an individual president. I draw attention to the complex...