Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Judicial Empowerment in Developing Countries

Notes

283 notes Chapter 1 1. Shapiro 1996, 1999, 2000; Larkins 1996; Ginsburg 2003; Stephenson 2003; Hirschl 2004; Chavez 2004; Finkel 2005, 2008; Helmke and Rosenbluth 2009; Smithey-Ishiyama and Ishiyama 2000, 2002. 2. The term “new democracies,” as employed in this book, refers to developing states that experienced a transition to democracy and retained their status as democracies for at least the first four post–transition years. 3. See, for example, Epp 1998; Burbank and Friedman 2002; Magaloni 2003; Ginsburg 2003; Chavez 2004; Vanberg 2008; Staton and Rios-Figueroa 2009; Helmke and Rios-Figueroa 2011. 4. The democratic-transition year for each country in table 1.1 is identified using the Przeworski et al. 2000 data set and the Polity indicator of the year of democratic transition. 5. Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 are drawn from constitutional data on each de jure judicial independence component listed above. This data—described in chapter 3—is available for 63 newly democratized developing states in table 1.1. 6. Following Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, and Shipan (2007) and Carrubba et al. (2008), we define “full judicial review” here and throughout this book broadly. It includes the review by courts (not only constitutional courts) of statutes, constitutional provisions, legislative bills, amendments, and government acts. In fig. 1.2, we distinguish full judicial review from a situation where the courts do not have any judicial review authority. 7. Studies of de jure judicial independence in new democracies that focus, for example, on Latin America include Helmke and Rios-Figueroa 2011; Brinks and Blass 2010; Hilbink 2007, Kapiszewski 2007, Kapiszewski and Taylor 2008. 8. For this, see, for example, Burbank and Friedman 2002; Hayo and Voigt 2003; Carrubba 2009; Chavez 2008; Vanberg 2008; Rodriguez and McCubbins 2008; Helmke and Rosenbluth 2009; Rios-Figueroa and Staton 2009. 9. Rosenn 1987; Vyas 1999; Widner 2001; Russell and O’Brien 2001; Herron and Randazzo 2003; Hayo and Voigt 2007; Chavez 2008; Vanberg 2008; RiosFigueroa and Staton 2009; Woods and Hilbink 2009. 10. For the Argentina case see, for instance, Helmke 2005; Kapiszewski 2007. For the Ukraine case, see Smithey-Ishiyama and Ishiyama 2002; Open Society Institute 2001, 2003; Popova 2010. 284 notes to pages 4–11 11. Chapter 5 describes this de facto judicial independence measure and the sources used to operationalize this measure. The list of these 103 newly consolidated and established developing country democracies is provided in chapter 5, table 5.1. 12. We discuss in detail later and in chapter 2, various studies that examine how other factors including the existence of separation of powers, political competition, civil society actors, judicial culture, and economic globalization influence de facto judicial independence. 13. See Ramseyer 1994; Stephenson 2003; Whittington 2003; Hansen 2004; Beer 2006; McCubbins et al. 2006 and Ferejohn et al. 2007 for both theoretical discussions and empirical analyses. 14. The predicted probability of failure (hazard rate) of governments across 103 developing democracies in table 1.2—which is a proxy for their time horizons in office—is derived from estimating discrete-time hazard models of government survival . This measure and the data used to derive this measure are described in chapter 5. 15. For further discussions of the conceptual differences between de jure and de facto institutional characteristics and their effects see Hagger 1982; Taylor 1992; Burbank and Friedman 2002; Herron and Randazzo 2003; Norris 2003; Hayo and Voigt 2007; Vanberg 2008; Chavez 2008; Rios-Figueroa and Staton 2009. 16. For detailed discussions of de jure institutional characteristics see McCubbins and Rodriguez 2008; Thabane 2006; Gourevitch 2005; Norris 2003; Taylor 1992; Hagger 1982. 17. These relationships are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. See Becker 1970; Herron and Randazzo 2003; Vanberg 2008 for arguments relating specific institutional rules to higher levels of de jure independence. 18. See Shapiro 1981, 2002; Russell and 0’Brien 2001; Ginsburg 2003, 2008; Herron and Randazzo 2003; Vanberg 2001, 2005; Tushnet 2008 for further discussion. 19. Scholars also differentiate between abstract review, which allows review prior to passage of legislation and concrete review, which can only be requested post legislation. Full judicial review refers to systems with both powers. 20. Currently countries that have review powers are almost evenly divided between the two arrangements (Ginsburg 2008). 21. Rogers and Vanberg 2000; Stone Sweet 2000; Vanberg 2001; Shapiro 2002. 22. See Larkins 1996; World Bank 2004; Feld and Voigt 2003; Hayo and Voigt 2007; Vanberg 2008; Kapiszewski and Taylor 2008; McCubbins and Rodriguez 2008 for further discussions of various widely used...