Democratic Peace: A Political Biography

Notes

219 Notes Introduction 1. More and more studies pointed out in recent years the influence of the democratic peace theories on the world outside academia, see Owen IV (2005), Brock, Geis, and Müller (2006:3), Büger and Villumsen (2007), Smith (2007), Acuto (2008), Desch (2007/08), Hobson (2009:636, 2011), Moses, (2010), Steele (2010), Geis and Wagner (2011). 2. For examples, see chapter 2. 3. For a full discussion, see chapter 7. 4. See chapter 1 for literature review. 5. However, it should be noted that the book’s focus is mainly on the political fortunes of the democratic peace thesis in the United States and Israel, not in Europe . A brief Bourdieusian account of the political happenings of the thesis in the context of NATO can be found in Büger and Villumsen (2007). 6. For a very detailed study of the Arab peace discourse as an obstacle to the peace process see Sela (2005). 7. I borrow the term from Emanuel Adler (1997). Chapter 1 1. There are analogical affinities between my own view of the political biography of theory and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s theory of the life cycle of norms (1998). 2. In that my thinking is in line with Science and Technology Studies (STS). See, for example, Latour 1987; Jasanoff 1990, 2005; Pielke 2007; Longino 2002. For STS in IR, see Büger and Gadinger 2007. 3. Freeden himself distinguishes among genetic, functional, and semantic analysis, claiming that his analysis is semantic. Freeden defines genetic analysis as “how did a particular set of political views come about?” (1996:3). He characterizes functional analysis as questioning “what is the purpose, or role (if unintended), of a particular set of political views?” and that semantic analysis asks “what are the implications and the insights of a particular set of political views, in terms of the conceptual connections it forms?” (3). But this declaration applies to the analysis in his book of the various particular ideologies, as can also be inferred from the abovequoted definitions. On that level Freeden is correct, and he deals with the semantic 220 Notes to Pages 19–30 meanings of the various particular ideologies, including liberalism, conservatism, Marxism, etc. But on a deeper level, in his theoretical discussion, Freeden is guided by his analysis of ideologies as configurations that decontest political concepts. This is a functional definition of ideology. Moreover, according to Freeden, people act according to their understanding of ideologies. If this is the case, then ideologies are not only semantic configurations but also configurations oriented toward political praxis. In other words, ideologies are action oriented (1996:3, 77). Thus, ideologies have functions, and the definition of the political phenomenon known as ideology, or the more general political phenomenon known as political thought, is a functional definition. 4. See also Adler 2002; Davis 2005; Weldes 1996. 5. See chapter 6. 6. For additional literature on political, policy, or public entrepreneurship, see Checkel 1997; Young 1994:45–46, 114–15; Schneider and Teske with Mintrom 1995; Schneider and Teske 1992; Kingdon 1995:179–83, 204–5; Kirchheimer 1989. Risse and Sikkink (1999) use their terminology of“transitional advocacy networks ” to convey a somewhat similar idea. Ethan Nadelmann (1990:482) refers to NGO’s as“transnational moral entrepreneurs.” 7. Among the many definitions of the concept of agency the one I prefer most is by Anthony Lang, who explicitly links agency to responsibility:“agent capable of formulating and undertaking plans of action for which they can be held responsible” (2008:96). 8. This theoretical move might help to resolve a recent theoretical debate within the Constructivist School of International Relations. While earlier IR theories are inclined to ignore issues of rhetoric and communicative action completely,constructivism analyzes these issues as crucial to the understanding of world politics. However ,while most constructivists tend to use a Habermasian framework for analyzing rhetoric and communicative actions, some have moved to analyzing them as manipulative apparatuses, as yet another device of coercion and power relations. By shifting their focus from the rhetors to the assets available to them, theoreticians may abandon the dichotomist reading of rhetoric in world politics. Persuasive resources are out there to be used in a Habermasian or a manipulative way; they could be used manipulatively to mask real interests, or sincerely to elucidate real interests. A more valuable theoretical treatment enabled by focusing on rhetorical capital would involve clarifying the reasons and conditions that both facilitate and lead to each...