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6. Christian Democracy in Practice: Economic Discourse and Policy
- University of Michigan Press
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126 Chapter 6 Christian Democracy in Practice: Economic Discourse and Policy More than any other controversy, the battle over Christian Socialism defined the interconfessional alliance at the heart of German Christian Democracy. By delineating the outlines for Christian Democratic economics, party members’ discourse ultimately determined the boundaries of Christian Democratic antimaterialism . Widespread and yet in many ways undifferentiated, Christian Democratic support for Christian Socialism necessarily blurred the party’s antimaterialist rejection of socialism—the historic foundation of ProtestantCatholic political cooperation. At the same time, the increasingly hostile international climate polarized all European exchanges about capitalism and communism. In short order, CDU economic policy found itself caught in the crosshairs of Protestant-Catholic relations and the Cold War, to the decisive detriment of Christian Socialists. Early Opposition to Christian Socialism The Christian Socialist debate took hold quickly after the December 1945 Bad Godesberg conference; by early 1946, the formation of two fronts within the party—one associated with Adenauer, the other with Kaiser—was so conspicuous that party members regarded support for one leader as a threat to their standing with the other.1 In part a result of Adenauer’s personal assumption of power, the conflict would also be sustained by the June 1946 founding of the Social Committees of the Christian Democratic Employees (Sozialausschüsse der christlich-demokratischen Arbeitnehmerschaft). Modeled on the workers’ committees of the pre-1933 Center Party and based in Cologne, the Social Committees were tied closely to the Dominican clergy Siemer and Welty, who hosted educational courses for workers in the Walberberg cloister. Led primar- Christian Democracy in Practice 127 ily by Johannes Albers, the committees derived their early membership almost exclusively from Catholic North Rhine-Westphalians; despite electing those Protestants who joined to the Executive Committee, the committees never succeeded in attracting a significant Protestant following.2 In addition to Wuppertal Protestants, who argued that the Social Committees would exacerbate internal party tensions,3 middle-class CDU Catholics resisted the organization of the Social Committees.4 Equally concerned was DGB leader Hans Böckler; already uneasy that former Christian Trade Unionists were underrepresented in the Trade Union Federation, Böckler now feared that the former trade unionists, especially with their ties to Western European Christian Trade Unions, would refound their Christian union.5 While the former trade unionists established the Social Committees, their adversaries gathered strength as well. After securing his command of the zonal and Rhenish CDU parties, Adenauer began immediately to put his personal stamp on the party’s programmatic development. Accused by Otto Schmidt of the “application of the Führer principle,” Adenauer brooked little opposition in crafting the British zone CDU’s first official programmatic statement.6 In large part a product of Adenauer’s vision and political authority, the March 1, 1946, NeheimH üsten Program highlights the rootedness of Adenauer’s early understanding of Christian Democracy in bourgeois Rhenish Catholicism.7 After insisting that Christian ethics inspire not only all aspects of state reconstruction but also the delimitation of state power, the program called for the “mixed socialization [Vergesellschaftung] of the mines” and “modest property for all honest workers” in the name of securing democracy. In addition, the Neheim-Hüsten program proposed banning the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few or large organizations to protect the freedom of the Persönlichkeit. Neheim-Hüsten opted specifically not to embrace the nationalization of industry, noting that “the question of socialization of elements of the economy is not practical, in that the German economy is not free. For its later regulation, economic and political criteria—above all the common good—will be determining.”8 To be sure, the elision of Christian Socialism in Neheim-Hüsten reflected Adenauer’s influence. But the decision to sidestep the socialization question also signaled the beginning of a shift within the western CDU against the politics and personages associated with Berlin.9 In February 1946, Kaiser received word from Otto Lenz that anti-Berlin tendencies were taking hold in Frankfurt and the Rhineland; even as they supported Christian Socialism, members of the Frankfurt CDU condemned Kaiser’s claim to represent the entire CDU as “Berlin centralism.”10 If western Christian Democrats had hitherto not publicly [3.238.64.201] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 09:29 GMT) 128 The Origins of Christian Democracy challenged the CDUD, Adenauer opined, they certainly did not recognize its authority.11 Kaiser, for his part, was well aware of these tensions; he had articulated anti...