Japan and China as Charm Rivals: Soft Power in Regional Diplomacy

1. A Short History of Charm in Japan-China Relations

23 one A Short History of Charm in Japan-China Relations Given the high level of distrust and antagonism between Japan and China to­ day, it is hard to believe that charm has ever played a role in Sino­Japanese relations. Japan, however, was among the first noncommunist countries that the newly founded People’s Republic sought to woo. In this process, China found an unexpected army of Japanese recipients, driven by either ideological affinity or commercial lure, willing to propagate or even fabri­ cate charm. Given the presence of such fascination, either real or imagined, the two countries’ recent attitudinal U­turn demands explanation: Despite extensive material and human connections, how has Japan metamorphosed from a prime target of attraction into the focus of nationwide hatred? How has the Japanese side responded to Beijing’s changed approach? This chapter examines charm’s ever­dwindling role in China­Japan relations. The trajectory of bilateral relations can be divided into three phases, with each phase manifesting a unique pattern of diplomatic woo­ ing. From the founding of the People’s Republic to the end of the Cul­ tural Revolution, Chinese leaders, particularly Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, launched a “peace offensive [heping gongshi]” charac­ terized by conciliatory gestures. These leaders also attempted to build a common identity with Japan by Othering the United States as the com­ mon enemy. Such framings struck a cross­ideological chord among the Japanese, who were yearning for independence and autonomy. Beijing’s effort to woo was intermittent at best, subject to domestic turbulence. Yet the Japanese popular desire to achieve meaningful independence from the United States by having a more autonomous China policy helped sideline 24 japan and china as charm rivals chaotic Chinese policies. The “charm offensive” was more of a Japan­fab­ ricated, self­serving homegrown phenomenon than a deliberate Chinese strategy. From the Japanese end, both the continued fear of the spread of communism and the public befuddlement at China’s adolescent temper at­ test to the shallow nature of China’s attraction. The late 1970s and 1980s marks the second phase, the “honeymoon era,” when material and human exchanges between China and Japan grew exponentially. Bonding at the top level became more balanced, as charac­ terized by the near­brotherhood between Japanese prime minister Naka­ sone Yasuhiro and China’s party chief Hu Yaobang. Despite such progress, the label honeymoon is misleading, because anti­Japan sentiment began to explode in China during the 1980s. Hu was eventually sacrificed on the al­ tar of domestic infighting, with conservatives citing his pro­Japan stance as his major fault. The real puzzle, therefore, is not the cordiality of the rela­ tions but why Japan’s positive perception of China weathered such storms at both elite and popular levels. Two factors at play in the first phase—elite perception and popular discourses—continued the tradition of fabricat­ ing charm for China. The country became a unique communist state and, more important, an eager student of Japan. The interplay between foreign policy and state images now tilted toward China’s progressive state image, with its anti­Japan sentiment sidelined. The 1989 Tiananmen Massacre marked the beginning of the end of charm’s role in Sino­Japanese relations. Japanese popular discourses re­ garding Chinese charm lost major ground as the bond of common values proved illusive. Given China’s rise and Japan’s malaise, such fabrication also no longer had much domestic demand. Leaders still matter, though in a different direction, as fond feelings were replaced by open hostility. To some extent, Jiang Zemin and Koizumi Jun’ichiro personified their respec­ tive countries’ worsened images.The impact from the chilly Jiang­Koizumi years has been enduring, as their successors are still coping with vengeful nationalism. At the same time, willing interpreters of Chinese charm have become few and far between in Japan, and vice versa. Negative foreign policy and state images feed on each other and create a downward spiral. Othering has persisted as a mentality and tactic, but now China and Japan have turned on each other, appealing to third coun­ tries. The two countries have used in­group bonding and Othering in their wooing efforts elsewhere. Cultural exchanges have largely failed to exert meaningful influence on diplomatic issues and thus have lost their connection with power. At some A Short History of Charm in Japan-China Relations 25 moments, cultural exchanges...