Japan and China as Charm Rivals: Soft Power in Regional Diplomacy

Notes

175 Notes Introduction 1. Xun Mou and Jie Song, “Zhongguo de biaozhi keneng buzaishi long [Dragon May No Longer Fit to Serve as China’s Symbol],” Xinwen Chenbao [News Morning Daily], December 4, 2006. 2. Han Han, Guanyu Shanghai. 3. Wen Jiabao speech. 4. Shihao Zhang, “Zhuchiren jianyi xiong mao qu dai long zuo wei minzu tuteng [Anchor Stirs Up Controversy by Suggesting Panda as Na­ tional Symbol],” Chengdu Shangbao, December 27, 2008, http://news.163 .com/08/1227/03/4U519EG400011229.html. 5. Ibid. 6. As one journalist at Dongfang Zaobao [Oriental Morning Daily] told me (in­ terview, November 22, 2008), such stories are “ridiculous,” and “ridiculous stories sell papers,” an opinion with which an editor at Dongfang Guangbo Diantai [Oriental Radio] concurred. 7. Chinese State Council Information Office, White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development (Beijing, 2005), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005­12/22/con tent_3954937.htm. 8. “Besutosera kaiko 2006: Kyoyo shinsho kocho wo iji [Review of Bestsellers in 2006: Character­Building Books Remain Popular],” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 20, 2006. 9. Sasaki, “Commercial Cultivation of Tradition.” 10. Aso, “New Look at Cultural Diplomacy.” 11. McGray, “Japan’s Gross National Cool.” 12. Diamond, Spirit of Democracy, 318–20. 13. For an analysis of how in­group bonding depends on negatively defining external relations with other groups, see De Vries,“Self, In­Group, and Out­Group Evaluation.” 14. Nye, Soft Power, 7. 15. Ibid., 8. 176 Notes to Pages 5–16 16. Hobbs, Leviathan, 94–98. 17. Machiavelli, Prince, 48–51, 57–59. 18. Russett, “Mysterious Case.” 19. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics.” See also Keohane, After Hegemony, 49, 51–64. For a critique on the limited fungibility of power, see Art, “American Foreign Policy.” 20. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics.” 21. Nye, Soft Power, 4. 22. O’Neil, Fields, and Share, “Germany,” 192–93. 23. “The Polish Farewell,” Economist, December 1–7, 2007, 67. 24. See, for example, Kirshner, “States, Markets, and Great Power Relations.” 25. Nye, Soft Power, 6. 26. “Special Report: China: Culture, Economy, and Military Power—The New Giant Flexes Its Muscles,” Newsweek, April 1, 1996. 27. Nye, Soft Power, 12–14. 28. Japanese Cabinet Office, Gaiko ni kansuru yoron chosa [Annual Survey on Foreign Policy], http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h21/h21­gaiko/2­1.html. 29. “Seicho chugoku to teimeinihon: Rakkan to hikan kukkiri [Growing China and Depressing Japan: Contrast between Optimism and Pessimism],” Asahi Shimbun , September 27, 2002. 30. Konno, “Sofuto pawa to nihon no senryaku,” 5–7. 31. For a recent example of a book on American soft power almost exclusively reliant on these cultural and commercial images, see Fraser, Weapons of Mass Distraction . 32. For a discussion why commercial products should not be counted as power, see Ferguson, “Think Again.” 33. Nye, Soft Power, 11. 34. Harding, speech. 35. “Chaoxian dapuo yiguan zuofa guli nüxing chuan kuzi dan bu tichang jin­ shenku [Korea Lifts Old Ban and Encourages Women to Wear Pants but Discour­ ages Tight Ones],” Dongfang Wang [East Day News], August 20, 2008, http://news .eastday.com/w/20090820/u1a4595423.html. 36. Schneider, Culture Communicates, 7. 37. Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 18. 38. Kuniya Hiroko, “Kurozu appu gendai [Today’s Close­Up],” NHK, April 3, 2004. 39. Anthony Faiola, “Japanese Women Catch the ‘Korean Wave,’” Washington Post, August 30, 2006. 40. Zhang, “Dang qian taiguoren de zhongguoguan,” 61–62. 41. U.S. Department of State, Dictionary of International Relations Terms, 85. For a thorough exploration of the evolution of public diplomacy as a concept, with its focus on communicating with publics of other countries, see University of South­ ern California Center on Public Diplomacy, “What Is Public Diplomacy?,” http:// uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/about/what_is_pd. 42. U.S. Department of State, Dictionary of International Relations Terms, 85. 43. In fact, a glance at Chinese media coverage gives the impression that Japa­ nese politicians developed a habit of saying that China was “not a threat” to Japan. Notes to Pages 17–28 177 See, for example, “Xiaoquan 2005 zongjie: Zhongguo fazhan bushi weixie [Koi­ zumi Sums up 2005: China’s Development Is Not a Threat],” Dongfang Zaobao, December 29, 2005; “Futiankangfu: Zhongguo fazhan shi jihui bushi weixie [Fu­ kuda Yasuo: China’s Development Is Opportunity, Not Threat],” Nanfang Zhoumo, September 27, 2007; “Masheng fandui zhongguo weixielun [Aso opposes ‘China Threat Thesis’],” China News Agency, April 29, 2009. 44. Fraser, Weapons of Mass Distraction, and...