Classical Spies: American Archaeologists with the OSS in World War II Greece

APPENDIXES

MAPPENDIXESM Internal Assessment as the archaeologists were debriefed at OSS Cairo or Area F, the Congressional Country Club outside Washington, they wrote histories of their operations and evaluated their experiences. From radio operators and ‹eld agents to Else and Edson, they chronicled similar problems. Penrose evaluated each report and excerpted its salient messages for Shepardson: lack of communication from Washington; inadequate brie‹ng, training in reporting, and direction in selecting what to cover; insuf‹cient staff; lack of clerical support resulting in decreased ef‹ciency; friction with British allies; unsatisfactory supply and transportation; and interbranch rivalries and divided authority necessitating a solitary commander at each base to manage the branches involved.1 Penrose, who evaluated Crosby’s ‹nal report, noted that The unfortunate fact with regard to the entire Greek Desk was that, although intelligence coverage was excellent and complete, there was actually very little American interest in the Greek scene. Our Greek Section was in the position of a man all dressed up and no place to go.2 Many problems stemmed from the quick growth of OSS and were common to operations in other regions. The need to get personnel into the ‹eld necessitated a short catchall training that would hopefully give a smattering of preparation for any espionage situation encountered abroad but, in fact, left SI agents ill prepared to gather and transmit secret intelligence. DeBardeleben admitted, “Dif‹culties in command, supply and training were due to inexperience and the necessity of improvising and shortcutting be293 cause of our late start.” Donovan’s “inept vertical organization” of OSS bureaucracy into branches arranged by function rather than by area caused other dif‹culties. This“in›exible departmentalization of OSS . . . had an adverse effect on operations” and required continuous liaison uniting branches operating in or connected with the same countries or regions.3 The lack thereof resulted in divided authority and lack of cooperation and communication between them. Security was another issue. Else mentioned that the archaeologists were “excessively spooky—concerned with mystery and intrigue.”Excessive concern for security hampered Dow’s ability to communicate. Georgiades complained of Sperling’s byzantine security measures. Meanwhile, the lack thereof in the Supply branch endangered Greek Desk operations in Izmir. The historian of OSS Cairo wrote,“The SI Greek section was in the very odd position of an American intelligence source almost all of whose reports , except political and economic ones, were of use only to the British.As curious to the British as would be to the Americans a British intention to procure intelligence from Panama or the Philippines.” It is true that Britain was far more interested in its product and that the archaeologists’ intent cleaved with Britain’s military strategy (the invasion of Greece); however to compare Greece to Panama is a misnomer since, though long dependent on the Great Powers, Greece was a sovereign nation. Although its intelligence had mainly been of use to its British allies (of whom it was highly critical), the Greek Desk’s SI also proved valuable to U.S. agencies concerned with Balkan political and economic matters. MacVeagh regarded it as of “precious assistance” in giving him the “bene‹t of an overall view,” and Laird Archer, in charge of relief and rehabilitation efforts, credited SI as his “quickest channel of communication” of “precise and most useful intelligence .”4 And that was before liberation. From Amoss on down, the Greek Desk suffered from insuf‹cient administrative experience. Not “bureaucratically minded,” Rodney Young proved a poor administrator. John Calvocoressi, who worked in Cairo and as ‹eld agent on Evvia, claimed that Young proved incapable of reaching any decision as to future operations. . . . The Greek desk in Cairo suffered from a lack of proper organization and administrative talent, . . . a lack of planning . . . personnel being obtained for one purpose and used for another [Calvo’s own situation] or being found useless; sharp ›uctuations between comparative idleness and too heavy 294 • Internal Assessment work; avoidable last-minute rushes; vagueness concerning functions; terms of employment. DeBardeleben noted,“While bases were in desperate need of quali‹ed personnel , Cairo had individuals whose missions had been cancelled ‘with no pro‹table work to do.’” Things improved when Else arrived in November 1943 and assumed much of the burden for new operations, including all those dispatched from Bari.5 Young interfaced poorly with other branches that dovetailed with SI at every point. They should have been most closely coordinated...