Games, Information, and Politics
Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science
Publication Year: 1997
Published by: University of Michigan Press
Contents
Preface
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pp. ix-x
We wrote this book for those political scientists who have an interest in game theory and want to know more. Most political scientists now know some rudimentary game theory but really do not understand how it can be used to improve our understanding of politics. Our intention is to address this problem...
1. Modeling with Games
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pp. 12-22
A game involves situations in which individuals are aware that their actions affect one another. To study the strategic interaction of individuals, we use game theory. Social, political, and economic interactions abound with such strategic behavior. Politics, in particular, is inherently strategic...
2. A Brief Introduction to Game Theoretic Models
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pp. 23-60
In this chapter, a brief overview of game theory is provided. This overview includes examinations of matrix form games, repeated games, extensive form games, and the equilibrium conditions connected with each...
3. Strategic Choice and Progressive Ambition in American Politics: An Examination of Rohde's Model
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pp. 61-82
A common problem in political science is the usage of decision theory, implicitly or explicitly, to examine strategic interactions. Depending on the question being asked, using a decision theoretic focus may yield vastly different results than a game theoretic one will. By using decision theory instead of game theory to study political situations involving strategic interactions, scholars may...
4. Dynamic Games and the Politics of International Trade: An Examination of Coneybeare's Trade Wars
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pp. 83-112
In this chapter we examine how game theory has been applied to the analysis of trade wars. Continuing with the theme of our book, we emphasize how game theoretic models can be used to model political phenomena with parsimony...
5. Information and Transitions to Democracy: An Examination of Przeworski's Democracy and the Market
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pp. 113-140
Information plays a critical role in many political interactions. When political actors must make choices under uncertainty, they may act differently than they would if they possessed complete and perfect information. This chapter stresses how uncertainty...
6. Commitment, Bluffs, and Reputation
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pp. 141-162
Any poker player will tell you that bluffing is an essential element of strategy. Bluffing is also important in strategic political interactions. When we bluff we manipulate an adversary's beliefs. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, any player lacking complete information must rely on beliefs...
7. Conclusion
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pp. 163-168
Over the last 15 years the use of game theory in political science has exploded in popularity. Pick up any copy of the American Political Science Review or the American Journal of Political Science and this becomes quite evident. Yet, a good proportion of the political science community has no background or training in this methodology. We provide an introductory overview...
References
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pp. 169-176
Index
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pp. 177-182
E-ISBN-13: 9780472027538
E-ISBN-10: 0472027530
Print-ISBN-13: 9780472065646
Print-ISBN-10: 0472065645
Page Count: 192
Illustrations: 32 tables
Publication Year: 1997
Series Title: Analytical Perspectives on Politics


