Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development Assistance

4. Foreign Aid and Ethnic Interests in Kenya

CHAPTER 4 Foreign Aid and Ethnic Interests in Kenya John M. Cohen Academics specializing in the design and implementation of foreign aid interventions have given little attention to ethnicity.1 As a result, it should not be surprising that aid agency handbooks fail to be explicit about ethnic issues, for academic products have an important impact on their content . This neglect, however, does not mean that those involved in aidfunded interventions fail to pay close attention to ethnic relationships. In this regard, the objective of this chapter is to present a set of Kenyan case studies that illustrate the extent to which politicians, public sector of‹cials, aid agency professionals, and expatriate technical assistance personnel consciously deal with ethnic issues over a wide range of projects, structural adjustment agreements, and aid conditionalities. Background Profile on Ethnicity and Policy Making In Kenya as in most sub-Saharan African countries, every government of‹cial’s evaluation of both domestic-funded and aid agency–funded activities includes their speci‹c effects on ethnic groups. In public speeches, press releases, and private interviews, of‹cials and opposition leaders constantly talk about foreign aid in terms of ethnic areas and interests .2 So, too, expatriate aid-related professionals working in Kenya constantly take ethnic interests into account, directly referring to the interests of speci‹c ethnic leaders, groups, and areas. Among themselves and with Kenyan politicians and civil servants, such professionals typically discuss ethnic issues knowledgeably, frankly, and openly. Kenya’s estimated 25.7 million people are classi‹ed into approximately 40 ethnic groups.3 Three groups, the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luyha, none of which is numerically dominant, make up an estimated 50 percent of the country’s African population. Two smaller groups, the Kamba and Kalenjin, are each estimated to contain 10 percent of this population. In 90 sum, ‹ve ethnic groups comprise approximately 70 percent of the African population. Importantly, ethnic aggregation can be misleading, for there are crosscutting cleavages within groups and mutually self-serving relations between members of different groups.4 First, a number of ethnic groups are in effect composite categories covering smaller distinct but related groups. For example, the currently dominant Kalenjins are made up of a number of smaller groups, one of which, the Tugen, is President Daniel arap Moi’s ethnic group. Second, a given ethnic group can be divided into factions. For example , the Kikuyu, the ethnic group of Kenya’s ‹rst president, Jomo Kenyatta , has long been divided into two highly competitive region-based factions : the Kiambu Kikuyu and the Nyeri Kikuyu. This competition is expressly recognized in the rhetoric of politicians, formation of political groupings, reporting in the press, intergovernmental struggles for resources, and design and implementation of aid agency interventions. Third, individuals belonging to an ethnic group not part of the national ruling coalition can and do become involved with that coalition’s political party. Throughout Kenya’s political history, individuals from all ethnic groups have voted for and worked with the dominant political party and the coalition that controls it. All ethnic constituencies elect members of Parliament (MPs) under the banner of the dominant party. But most MPs from ethnic groups not part of the coalition do not get ministerial appointments and have dif‹culty gaining access to government resources for their home areas. Further, civil servants in effect work for the dominant coalition as they implement its policies, projects, and programs. But being a public servant does not preclude one from (1) facilitating the transfer of government resources to one’s home area or (2) using red tape and related strategies to stall or limit efforts by other ethnic groups to obtain government resources for their home areas. In this regard, today’s public sector is largely organized to generate the resources required by ethnic godfathers to stay in power, a variation on the common pattern of crony statism found in many sub-Saharan African countries.5 The prevailing system relies heavily on the ability of ethnic leaders to control the distribution of projects, jobs, and rent niches required to support clientele networks and fragment ethnic opposition.6 From 1960 to 1965 the dominant ethnic coalition was led by President Kenyatta’s Kikuyu, with the support of the Luo and the Kamba. After 1965 the Luo ceased to belong to the coalition and the Meru and Embu were added. Since 1978, political power has been held by President Moi’s Kalenjin and a shifting coalition currently made up of the Masai...