Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development Assistance

3. USAID and Ethnic Conflict: An Epiphany?

CHAPTER 3 USAID and Ethnic Conflict: An Epiphany? Heather S. McHugh This chapter examines the approach of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to ethnic con›ict—whether it addresses ethnic con›ict in its policies, programs, or projects; why it is interested in ethnic con›ict; and how it approaches ethnic con›ict and ethnicity.1 As an independent agency within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, USAID is both actively involved in and greatly affected by the current heated debate on the formulation of post–Cold War foreign policy in the United States. Therefore, the ‹rst section of this chapter attempts to address some of the foreign policy themes that are emerging from the post–Cold War foreign policy debate and shaping USAID’s response to ethnic con›ict. A policy of “selective involvement” seems to best capture U.S. foreign policy today. In the second section of this chapter, both internal and external motivations for USAID’s engagement in ethnic con›ict are examined. In the third section, USAID’s past experiences with ethnic con›ict are brie›y described. In the fourth section, the way in which USAID is now attempting to deal with ethnic con›ict is detailed. What Are U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives? Since the end of the Cold War, borderless problems, such as civil, religious , and ethnic con›ict, seem to have emerged with a vengeance as the predominant form of con›ict in the world. Issues that were long buried under the tense stability of the Cold War have resurfaced—including separatism , the recon‹guration of state borders, war-crimes tribunals, and even genocide. The intensity of the problems has generated among donors a new terminology, including such phrases as “complex disaster,” “early warning systems,” “preventive development,”2 and “failed states.” The problems have even begun to push the international community into operating with different methodologies and theories—to dust off and revisit 49 old methodologies and theories, such as containment, public safety programs , and spillover effects. A 1994 report in the Chicago Tribune read: This turmoil caused by civil con›ict could disrupt export markets, encourage terrorism and other extremism, fuel regional arms races, and trigger refugee crises. “We no longer have the singular threat of communism,” said Brian Atwood, a former Clinton administration top foreign aid of‹cial and administrator of USAID, “we’re now dealing with the threat of chaos.” (Atlas 1994, 1) Without the anchor of political and economic realities and theories of the Cold War, recent U.S. foreign policy has been contradictory. Warren Christopher, while U.S. secretary of state, stated that the primary foreign policy task of the United States is “heading off the surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic and religious con›ict” around the world (as quoted in Jenkins 1993). However, the White House has focused its foreign policy on a strategy of “enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies ,” and such economic issues as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) comprise the main pillar of the Clinton doctrine (Nacht 1995, 194). Alexander Nacht, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies , reviewed recent academic foreign policy literature and suggested that ‹ve schools of thought represent the major diagnoses of world politics in the post–Cold War era (ibid., 197–201). • The “end of history” school, advanced by Francis Fukuyama, is based on the thesis that liberal democracy is the endpoint of ideological evolution and the ‹nal form of government; thus, U.S. foreign policy should focus on the spread of democratic ideals. • The “clash of civilizations” school, advanced by Samuel Huntington , is based on the concept that the fault lines of international con›ict will be based on culture divisions; thus, U.S. foreign policy should concentrate on containing the challenge of Confucian and Islamic culture to the predominant Western liberal tradition. • The “balance of power” school, founded by Hans Morgenthau and practiced by Henry Kissinger, is based on the concept that ‹ve (or six) power centers will dominate world politics in the years ahead; thus, U.S. foreign policy should focus on ensuring that no single power, or combination of powers, threatens U.S. vital interests. • The “primacy of economics” school, advanced by Charles Johnson, is based on the concept that increased attention to economic competition will de‹ne the future course of world politics. 50 Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Con›ict [18.119.107.161...