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The Domestic Opposition 79 groups loyal to such inside leadership tend to devote their energies to mobilizing outside support-the international community and the national community abroad-leaving the internal leadership with carte blanche to direct the antiregime campaign at home. The activities of the Korean Embassy-in-Exile,located in Washington, D.C. and inspired by Kim Dae Tung, the leader of the opposition New Korea Democratic Party, is an example of such outside-inside relations. Rallying the South Korean exiles in the United States, Kim Dae Tung attempted a two-front political assault on the Chun Doo Hwan regime , forming opposition inside Korea with compatriot exiles on the international front, mostly in the United States.4 The Internal-External Legitimacy Nexus Political exiles' ability to maintain a foothold at home enhances their prestige among their prospective supporters abroad, both national and foreign. Political exiles without an active organization at home (and thus forced to concentrate mobilizing efforts exclusively in the international arena) are likely to encounter severe problems in mustering outside support. To convince international forces to support their struggle, exiles must continually provide concrete evidence or at least give the appearance of their capacity to maintain strong loyalties at home. Failure to do so may lead international contributors to look at the exiles as "generals without an army who are not worth taking seriously."s National followers abroad are constantly searching for information that will provide a measure of the home regime's instability and prospects for breakdown, embracing any reports suggesting a clandestine resistance at home. Such home resistance is more likely to commit its support to exile groups that demonstrate a strong presence at home. Hence many exile organizations take pride in retaining a foothold within the clandestine home opposition and discredit competing exile groups for failing to maintain such connections, often dubbing them "theoretical," "impractical," or "irrelevant." Spanish communist exiles in the early 1950s rebuilt their organization within Spain, developing "a strategical and tactical programme which was based on the principle of struggle from within."6 They viewed other Republican exile groups with contempt for not accepting the necessity of clandestine operations against Franco.7 A more dramatic case involved the nust, the Stalin-sponsored pseudoexile organization (see chapter 8) set up by G.P'U. agents. The nust sought to track down authentic monarchist exiles in Europe. This decoy or~ The Domestic Opposition 79 groups loyal to such inside leadership tend to devote their energies to mobilizing outside support-the international community and the national community abroad-leaving the internal leadership with carte blanche to directthe antiregime campaign at home. The activities of the Korean Embassy-in-Exile, located in Washington, D.C. and inspired by Kim Dae Jung, the leader of the opposition New Korea Democratic Party, is an example of such outside-inside relations. Rallying the South Korean exiles in the United States, Kim Dae Jung attempted a two-front political assault on the Chun Doo Hwan regime , forming opposition inside Korea with compatriot exiles on the international front, mostly in the United States.4 The Internal-External Legitimacy Nexus Political exiles' ability to maintain a foothold at home enhances their prestige among their prospective supporters abroad, both national and foreign. Political exiles without an active organization at home (and thus forced to concentrate mobilizing efforts exclusively in the international arena) are likely to encounter severe problems in mustering outside support. To convince international forces to support their struggle, exiles must continually provide concrete evidence or at least give the appearance of their capacity to maintain strong loyalties at home. Failure to do so may lead international contributors to look at the exiles as "generals without an army who are not worth taking seriously."s National followers abroad are constantly searching for information that will provide a measure of the home regime's instability and prospects for breakdown, embracing any reports suggesting a clandestine resistance at home. Such home resistance is more likely to commit its support to exile groups that demonstrate a strong presence at home. Hence many exile organizations take pride in retaining a foothold within the clandestine home opposition and discredit competing exile groups for failing to maintain such connections, often dubbing them "theoretical," "impractical," or "irrelevant." Spanish communist exiles in the early 1950s rebuilt their organization within Spain, developing "a strategical and tactical programme which was based on the principle of struggle from within."6 They viewed other Republican exile groups with contempt for not accepting the...

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