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chapter 2 Islam’s Multiple Voices Despite the presence of substantial evidence to the contrary, some of which has been presented in the ‹rst chapter of this book and will be elaborated on in later chapters, many in the West continue to consider Islam to be a monolith. This monolithic perception of Islam often ‹nds expression in articles, commentaries , and editorials that posit a clash between “Islam” and the “West.” The latest incarnation of this thesis of a clash of civilizations, inspired by Princeton historian Bernard Lewis and most vividly presented by Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington,1 predates the events of 9/11. However, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington and the later attacks in Madrid and London have given the thesis much greater credibility among the Western public than had been the case earlier. This thesis is predicated on an essentialist interpretation of Islam as “civilization ” (in the singular) rather than as religion and code of ethics that affects and is, in turn, affected by multiple cultural and geographic milieus. Consequently , its popularization has augmented a unitary impression of Islam and Muslims in the West that conceals the enormous diversity not only among Muslim opinion in general but even among those groups characterized as fundamentalists or Islamists. The major impact of the essentialist and monolithic interpretation of Islam on Western perceptions is not merely to paint all Muslims with the same black brush but also to accord the most extremist and violent elements among Islamist activists, who fulminate viciously against the West and on occasion commit dramatic acts of terror, the position of authentic spokespersons for Islam. The latter conclusion is based on the proclivity of the extremist factions to justify their violent actions by quoting selectively from the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet. It is often ignored that they pluck such quotes out of context and stretch their meanings, through very creative 23 interpretations, to absurd limits that include justifying the killing of civilians— Muslims and non-Muslims alike.2 According such extremist elements the right to speak for Islam or for the vast majority of Muslims is totally unjusti‹ed. As the ‹rst chapter has argued and later chapters will substantiate, they are fringe elements in the world of Islam and are almost totally irrelevant to the fundamental issues that most Muslims are busy tackling in their discrete societies. Moreover, just as there is no Islamic monolith, there is no single individual, group, or institution that can rightfully claim to speak for Muslims, let alone on behalf of Islam. As Robert Hefner has pointed out, today “most Muslim societies are marked by deep disagreements over just who is quali‹ed to speak as a religious authority and over just how seriously ordinary Muslims should take the pronouncements of individual scholars.”3 A Historical Quandary The question of who speaks for Islam is not a new quandary for most Muslims and has historically been dif‹cult to answer. Islam has neither a pope nor a clearly delineated religious hierarchy. A loose hierarchical structure does exist among the Shia ulama, but even in Shia Islam, which is the minority branch, there is currently no single individual or organization that can pronounce authoritatively on theological—let alone political—issues. In the middle of the nineteenth century, an attempt was made in Iran to establish a single source of religious authority in Shia Islam, with the title marja-i-taqlid, meaning “the source of imitation.”4 However, this system broke down after the death of Ayatollah Borujerdi in 1961. Since then, several leading religious ‹gures have enjoyed the prerogative to issue edicts or rulings that become binding, but only on their respective followers—that is, on those who have chosen these particular ‹gures as sources of emulation.5 These rulings are not considered binding on the followers of other religious ‹gures of equal status . It was therefore no surprise that Ayatollah Khomeini’s arrogation of the right to speak on behalf of all of Shia Islam was greatly resented by many leading ayatollahs, both in and outside Iran, several of whom outranked him in the religious hierarchy before the Iranian Islamic revolution inspired by him in 1979. These divisions of opinion have been very important in the political realm, dividing those among the Shia ulama who endorse politically quietist interpretations of Islamic injunctions from those advocating politically activist inter24 / the many faces of political islam [3.138.118.250] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 21:26...

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