The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics

Notes

Notes C H A P T E R 1 1. On the relationship between grand strategy, trade, and domestic politics, Skålnes (2000) argues that states in need of allies will pursue favorable discriminatory foreign economic policies to strengthen domestic support for alliance in the target country. Papayoanou (1999) contends that economic ties generate domestic economic interests that in›uence a leader’s ability to mobilize resources against threatening powers. 2. I would like to thank a reviewer for the term second image reversed plus a second image, which emphasizes that this argument goes beyond examining the effect of international politics on domestic politics, by adding that the empowered coalition will affect the state’s foreign policy. On second image reversed politics, see Gourevitch 1977, 1978, 1986; Katzenstein 1978; Skocpol 1979; Kahler 1984; Weir and Skocpol 1985; James and Lake 1989; Rogowski 1989; Frieden 1991; Deudney and Ikenberry 1991–92; Berger and Dore 1996; Keohane and Milner 1996. 3. On integrating international and domestic politics, see Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993; Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993; Risse-Kappen 1995. On domestic winners and losers, see Frieden 1991; Freeman 1995; Keohane and Milner 1996; Kapstein 2000. 4. On other international factors affecting domestic coalitional politics and domestic institutional development, see Lane 1958; Bean 1973; Tilly 1975, 1990; Stein 1978; Skocpol 1979; Frieden 1988; and Campbell 1995. 5. On de‹nitions of grand strategy, see Barnett 1976, 11–15; Posen 1984, 6; Walt 1989, 6; Kennedy 1991, 1–7; Lef›er 1992, ix–x; Rosecrance and Stein 1993, 4–5; Kupchan 1994, 3, fn 4. 6. For a distinction between resource mobilization (wealth creation) and extraction (consumption of wealth), see the discussion in Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry 1989, 462–64. 7. Hegemonic stability theory makes the same assumption about decline. On 175 power transition and long cycle arguments, see Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987; Modelski 1987; Goldstein 1988; and Rasler and Thompson 1994. 8. Gilpin (1981) and Kennedy (1987) strengthen Organski’s original model by explaining why a hegemon cannot inde‹nitely sustain its dominant position. Although the hegemon reaps the bene‹ts from preponderance, domestic and international costs of governing the international system will contribute to the hegemon’s relative decline. The issue of balancing protection, investment, and consumption to arrest decline is complicated because a reduction in protection will result in external weakness, a reduction in consumption will contribute to internal social tension, and a reduction in investment will reduce the capacity of the hegemon to sustain its level of consumption and investment. Friedberg (1989a, 399–400) contends that the hegemon can maintain its existing rate of military spending by reducing public and especially private consumption. There is extensive literature on the prescriptions for great power resurgence; see Calleo 1987; Huntington 1987–88, 1988; Rosecrance 1990. 9. In contrast, as part of his argument, Kupchan argues that highly vulnerable declining powers will pursue overly cooperative policies in the core (1994, 17, table 2). Goldstein (1988) offers a slight twist to the power transition argument. He holds that more severe wars are likely to occur during the upswing phase instead of during the phase of hegemonic decline. His assumption is that economic expansion triggers competition among the great powers for scarce resources, and war becomes one means to secure them. 10. Kennan 1954; Waltz 1979; Walt 1989; Grieco 1990; Mearsheimer 1990, 2001; Van Evera 1990; Huntington 1993. Vital interests are ranked according to the size of territory, population, industrial capacity, military capability, and natural resources. 11. Writing shortly after World War II and in response to an emerging Soviet Union, Walter Lippmann (1943) and George Kennan (1954) argued that not all regions of the world were equally vital to American security. According to Kennan , only ‹ve centers of industrial and military power in the world (the United States, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan) were central to American national security. Since just one region was in hostile hands, Kennan’s policy of selective containment was intended to ensure that none of the other regions came under Soviet control. Kennan’s assessment was that only by conquering some or all of these vital power centers could the Soviet Union (or any other emerging contender, including America’s allies) tip the balance of power in its favor by commanding greater industrial power than the United States. Kennan objected to the argument that the United States had to resist communism wherever...