The Games of July: Explaining the Great War

Preface

In Flanders ‹elds the poppies blow Between the crosses, row on row john mccray Preface The First World War is doubtless the seminal event of the twentieth century. It is safe to say that had it not occurred, the history of the past hundred years would have been dramatically different. Had major-power war been avoided in 1914, it is likely that there would have been no Soviet Union, no Hitler, no Second World War, no Cold War, no nuclear arms race, and no post–Cold War period, to offer just a few possible counterfactuals.1 In this book, I explain to the reader and to myself why this cataclysmic war occurred. Implied in my purpose is dissatisfaction with existing historical explanations and with two in particular. The ‹rst is the revisionist explanation that the participants mindlessly “slithered” into the con›ict. In this view, the war that “no one wanted” was just a big mistake. To explain away the war as an unfortunate accident, however, is to beg the question and to offer no explanation at all. As Israel’s former prime minister, Menachem Begin, once asked rhetorically , “If both sides don’t want war, how can war break out?” In the pages that follow, I show why the “inadvertent war theory” fails to suf‹ce. The second historical explanation that falls short of the mark is the thesis that the First World War was simply willed by Germany. If accepted, the explanation is straightforward. Fearing a rising Russia, Germany instigated a preemptive war in 1914. Interpreted in this way, deterrence failed because, collectively , Russia, France, and possibly Great Britain lacked a capable retaliatory threat. As I demonstrate, this explanation, while logically unassailable, is empirically dubious. Having rejected these two case-speci‹c explanations, I next sought insight into the outbreak of the First World War by examining the causes of war in general . But the most prominent theoretical explanations were also found wanting. 1. For additional conjectures, see Cowley 2001. For commentary on the theoretical issues raised by counterfactual argumentation, see Tetlock and Belkin 1996. If anything, the First World War seemed to refute the liberal hypothesis that high levels of economic interdependence all but eliminate the likelihood of major-power war. I also judged various realist explanations to be de‹cient, some because they are logically incoherent, others because they are empirically questionable, and still others because they are theoretically degenerative. To explain the First World War, therefore, I turned to perfect deterrence theory, a general theory of international con›ict initiation, escalation, and war avoidance that I have developed in collaboration with D. Marc Kilgour. But, as originally speci‹ed, perfect deterrence theory was not immediately applicable to certain aspects of the con›ict. Accordingly, in a pair of articles, Kilgour and I expanded the theory to capture more fully the dynamics of extended deterrence relationships such as those that existed just prior to the outbreak of war in 1914. These axiomatically compatible extensions of our original theoretical framework form the basis of chapters 4 and 7. I am deeply grateful to Marc Kilgour for permission to draw on material from our jointly authored works for use in this book and more generally for what I have learned from him over the many years we have worked together. I also acknowledge several other individuals who have helped me, either directly or indirectly, write this book. Stephen Quackenbush read several chapters, delivered sage advice, and greatly improved the ‹nal product. I could not ask for a more helpful editor than Melody Herr at the University of Michigan Press. Her great patience and support have gone above and beyond the call of duty. Others who have offered criticism, insightful comments, and/or encouragement include Steven Brams, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Claudio Ciof‹-Revilla, Ray Dacey, Vesna Danilovic, Bill Geasor, Pat James, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Paul Senese, Randy Siverson, and John Vasquez. My three daughters, Catherine, Ann, and Elizabeth Zagare, have also been a source of much inspiration , each in her own way. (This is, after all, a book about deterrence failure.) I especially thank my favorite reference librarian, Patricia Zagare, who was on the constant lookout for relevant source material and who provided me with a number of invaluable leads. More than anyone, she has helped me survive this project. Finally, I thank my mother, to whom this book is dedicated. To her I wish to say,“I did it for you.” x preface ...