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Although we cannot bind ourselves under all circumstances to go to war with France against Germany, we shall also certainly not bind ourselves to Germany not to assist France. sir edward grey, april 1912 chapter seven Britain’s Strategic Dilemma Under considerable pressure from his political and military advisers, Czar Nicholas II ‹nally consented to a full mobilization of Russian armed forces against both Austria-Hungary and Germany on Thursday, July 30, 1914. The czar’s decision clearly placed Germany’s policymakers in an untenable position , for the Russian army vastly outnumbered its German counterpart (Kennedy 1987: 203). To offset the numeric de‹ciency, Germany’s war plans called for a rapid mobilization, a quick strike against France through Belgium and, with Austria ’s help, a defensive campaign against Russia in the east until the French were subdued. At that point, the German army was to do an about-face and turn east to take on the Russians.1 France, however, would have to be defeated quickly, before the Russian mobilization could be completed. Otherwise, the Russian “steamroller” would likely overwhelm German forces on the eastern front. Unless it reacted immediately , or unless all Russian mobilization efforts were suspended, Germany would lose its most important strategic advantage: speed. For German military planners, time was of the essence; delay, they believed, was tantamount to defeat . Decision makers in Berlin were well-aware that “Germany could not win a protracted war [of attrition] against Britain, France, and Russia” (Herwig 2003: 186). Understandably, then, it did not take long for German leaders to respond to the Russian mobilization decision. On the next day, Friday, July 31, the kaiser authorized the proclamation of a state of “imminent danger of war,” which 144 1. This, the standard interpretation of German war planning, is challenged in Zuber 1999; 2002a, b; 2004. was but a prelude to the general mobilization ordered the following afternoon. At the same time, the French government was given just eighteen hours to declare whether it intended to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Finally, the German ambassador, Count Friedrich von Pourtalès, delivered an ultimatum to Russia demanding a halt to all mobilization activities, including those directed against Austria-Hungary. On Saturday, August 1, Pourtalès returned to the Russian Foreign Of‹ce and asked three times whether Russia would cease and desist. And three times the Russian foreign minister, Serge Sazonov, replied negatively. At that point, “with trembling hands,” Pourtalès “presented S. D. Sazonov a note containing a declaration of war” (Schilling 1925: 77). Shortly thereafter, German troops crossed the Luxembourg border. All of Europe was not yet at war, but it was well on its way. The short delay is best attributed to a last-ditch German effort to preclude Great Britain’s entry into the war on the side of Russia and France. The attempt was not necessarily futile; as late as August 1, decision makers in Berlin had good reasons to hope that Britain might still stand aside. Just the previous day, for example , Sir Edward Grey, Great Britain’s foreign secretary, all but acknowledged that conditions existed under which Britain would allow the four continental powers to settle their dispute among themselves. According to Grey, he had told the German ambassador, Prince Karl Max von Lichnowsky, “that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty’s Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences” (Gooch and Temperley 1926: 11: no. 340). At the same time that German leaders were working to gain Britain’s neutrality , French of‹cials were desperately trying to get the British to do exactly the opposite. But Grey would not bite. On July 31, the French ambassador pressed Grey to make a public statement of support, but he politely but ‹rmly declined. Great Britain, he said, could not “undertake a de‹nite pledge to intervene in a war.”Of course, he also indicated that he would“certainly consider the situation again” should there be “a new development” (Gooch and Temperley 1926: 11: no. 352). A German declaration of war against France on August 3 apparently did not quite qualify as a“new development,”at least for...

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