The Games of July: Explaining the Great War

Chapter Six: La Guerre Europ

Now or never. kaiser wilhelm ii The game is up. william shakespeare chapter six La Guerre Européenne To the casual observer, not much of note seemed to be happening in Europe immediately after the meeting of the Austro-Hungarian Common Ministerial Council on July 7, 1914. The kaiser, intent on not tipping Germany’s hand, had the day before departed on a planned cruise aboard his private yacht, the Hohenzollern . And other leaders, in both Berlin and Vienna, acted as if nothing was afoot. Behind the scenes, however, Austrian of‹cials were being encouraged , strongly and incessantly, by German policymakers “not to neglect the present moment, but to treat Serbia with full energy, so as to clear out the conspirators ’ nest once for all” (Geiss 1967: 110). Nonetheless, Austria was slow to move. On July 14, Hungary’s minister-president, István Tisza, dropped his few remaining objections to the ultimatum. But the Ballhausplatz was still working on the document’s wording. Vienna obviously saw no need to rush. After all, the troops were still on leave and the French president and premier were not scheduled to leave St. Petersburg until July 23 (113–14).1 Toward the end of July, however, rumors began to swirl throughout Europe that Austria intended to seek restitution from Serbia. There were other indications as well (Rich 2003: 218). Thus, when the ultimatum was ‹nally delivered to Belgrade on July 23, soon after Raymond Poincaré and René Viviani had departed, Russian decision makers were hardly surprised. In fact, since Russia’s foreign minister, Serge Sazonov, feared that it was coming, he had already warned against it (Kautsky 1924: no. 120). The details of the ultimatum were formally conveyed to Sazonov by the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Count Friedrich Szápáry von Szápár, early the 110 1. Vienna initially believed that the French delegation would leave on July 25. next day. According to Szápáry, Sazonov “was more saddened and depressed than excited; the tactics he followed were not to commit himself with regard to Russia’s future attitude” (Geiss 1967: 175). Privately, however, Sazonov was more than agitated. As he exclaimed to his aide, Baron M. F. Schilling (1925: 28–29),“C’est la guerre européenne.” Szápáry’s démarche precipitated a ›urry of diplomatic activity in St. Petersburg . Sazonov had lunch at the French embassy with the French and British ambassadors, later joined by the ambassador from Rumania. He had already decided to take a hard-line stand against Austria and was looking for support from France and Britain. Sazonov got exactly what he wanted from the French. As George Buchanan, the British ambassador, reported to the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey,“France would not only give Russia strong diplomatic support, but would, if necessary, ful‹ll all the obligations imposed on her by the alliance” (Gooch and Temperley 1926: 11: no. 101).2 The explanation for this coordinated stand can also be drawn from an analysis of the Protégé-Defender Subgame discussed in detail in chapter 5. The model applies here as well for two speci‹c reasons. It would only be played out if (1) Challenger (i.e., Austria) invaded Serbia (which it eventually did) and (2) if a con›ict was implied if both Defender (France) and Protégé (Russia) held ‹rm, which was also the case. Apparently, Russia and France had settled on an equilibrium (i.e., a joint strategy pair) similar in spirit, if not in detail, to the equilibrium negotiated during the Hoyos mission to Berlin: if pressed too far, Russia would hold ‹rm against Austria (with certainty) and France would support the Russian decision (also with certainty). For reasons that are fully explained in chapter 7, however, the British ambassador was noncommittal at the luncheon at the French embassy. As Buchanan reported to Grey, he had held “out no hope that [the British government ] would make any declaration of solidarity that would entail engagement to support France and Russia by force of arms.”The best he could do was to suggest that Grey might be able to issue a vague warning to the Austrians and Germans that“it would be dif‹cult for England to remain neutral”should a European war break out. Finally, Buchanan speculated that“the moment had passed when it might have been possible to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia” (Gooch and Temperley 1926: 11: no. 101).3 La...