The Games of July: Explaining the Great War

Contents

Contents Preface ix part one. theoretical underpinnings chapter one. Purpose and Method 3 1.1. Bringing Theory to Bear on Data 6 1.2. Bringing Data to Bear on Theory 7 1.3. A Possible Objection and a Rejoinder 9 1.4. Blueprint 10 1.5. Scylla and Charybdis 12 1.6. Coda 14 chapter two. Theories and Explanations 19 2.1. The Realist Paradigm and Classical Deterrence Theory 21 2.2. Coda 37 chapter three. Perfect Deterrence Theory: An Overview 39 3.1. Axioms and General Theoretical Characteristics 40 3.2. Explaining the Absence of War 44 3.3. Theoretical Propositions, Empirical Expectations, and Policy Implications 49 3.4. Coda 56 part two. explaining the great war chapter four. Bismarck’s System 61 4.1. The Tripartite Crisis Game 64 4.2. Outcomes and Preferences 67 4.3. Analysis 72 4.4. Explaining the Austro-German Alliance of 1879 87 4.5. Coda 89 chapter five. Vienna, Berlin, and the Blank Check 90 5.1. Background 91 5.2. The Tripartite Crisis Game Redux 96 5.3. Analysis 100 5.4. Coda 106 chapter six. La Guerre Européenne 110 6.1. Asymmetric Escalation Game 113 6.2. Preferences 118 6.3. Some Caveats 120 6.4. Analysis 123 6.5. Discussion 128 6.6. Coda 143 chapter seven. Britain’s Strategic Dilemma 144 7.1. Modeling the Deterrence versus Restraint Dilemma 147 7.2. Preference Assumptions 148 7.3. Information and Utility Assumptions 151 7.4. Analysis 152 7.5. Explaining Britain’s Foreign Policy in 1914 158 7.6. Coda 166 part three. endgame chapter eight. Questions, Answers, Implications 171 8.1. Explanation 172 8.2. Theoretical Assessment 181 8.3. Implications and Final Thoughts 186 References 195 Index 209 ...