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Notes Chapter 1 1. Ward and Lofdahl (1995) allegedly found this figure on a poster in a Dutch bar. 2. A gravity model between two units i and} can be expressed as _ prl PF I i.j - K 13 DI.) where Ii.j denotes the (level of) interaction; Pi refers to the population, mass, or density of unit i; D i.j denotes the distance between units i and}; the terms aI' al> and f3 indicate constants, and K denotes a scale coefficient. Assuming equal mass or density among units, this simplifies to Ii.j = KDil Rapoport (1963) provides a useful overview relating gravity or distance decay models to other general models of social interaction. 3. Identifying the "real" issues of conflict is wrought with several difficulties. Territory, for example, is closely related to other contentious issues such as resources and ethnic diasporas. Wars must take place somewhere, hence it is hard to conceive of conflict not involving some territorial aspect. Even though some have attempted to test the relative importance of "territoriality" and "proximity " (e.g., Senese 1997; Vasquez 1995), researchers may interpret the relevant events differently. Disputes may involve more than one issue, and the relative importance of issues may vary among parties. Attempts to distinguish between territorial and nonterritorial disputes typically generate ambiguous cases. For example, Huth (1996) classifies the dispute over Berlin as territorial, despite its obvious relation to the superpower confrontation. By contrast, Finnish territory lost to the Soviet Union does not qualify as a territorial issue since the need for caution in its foreign policy prevented Finland from making public claims on the lost territory. 4. The term institution is sometimes restricted to organizations or formal structures and rules. Here I use the term more generally, including both formal and informal rules that entail stable patterns of social interaction (e.g., Knight 1992). 5. This is simply to illustrate the range of different feasible combinations of hostility and integration and not a literal claim that cooperation and conflict form a single underlying phenomenon in which one is merely the opposite of the 225 226 Notes to Pages 8-15 other. Conflict and cooperation may be at least partly independent, and many different combinations of the two may coexist. Accordingly, one may conceptualize ranges of possible relations in multidimensional space with separate hostility and integration dimensions (see, e.g., Bond, Jenkins, and Taylor 1997; and Boulding 1978, 1992). 6. Herz (1950) coined the term security dilemma. Whereas traditional realism holds conflict to be inherent to human nature (e.g., Morgenthau and Thompson 1985), structural varieties of realism relate conflict to the unavoidable potential for conflict in an anarchic international system (e.g., Waltz 1979). Jervis (1978) and Snyder (1971) illustrate through a series of simple game-theoretic models how the structural properties of anarchy induce problems of conflict and cooperation even when parties may have largely defensive motives. Powell (1993) contends that it is not so much any structural property of anarchy that creates the potential for conflict between states but the fact that states can resort to violence. 7. Grieco (1988) argues that many studies of the prospects for cooperation neglect the fact that states are concerned about relative gains from cooperation rather than merely absolute gains. Fear that other states will gain larger benefits that can be converted into greater power may impede cooperation even when absolute gains accrue to both sides. Snidal (1991) shows that relative gains can impede cooperation only under quite limited conditions. Powell (1993) shows that the core claims of realism can be expressed as special cases depending on the cost of using force in a model in which states maximize absolute gains, and he questions the utility of assuming that states maximize relative gains (see Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993). 8. Some researchers invoke mechanisms outside the international system such as individual actors (e.g., Gilpin 1981), periodic technological change, or economic fluctuations (e.g., Goldstein 1988) to "explain" changes in key elements of the international system. Regardless of whether these assertions are correct or not, they ultimately weaken the case for the primacy of systemic explanations. 9. Recent efforts have made substantial progress in modeling bilateral strategic interaction (see, in particular, Signorino 1999 and Smith 1999). Yet, with a few exceptions, such as Schrodt and Mintz 1988, studies have not modeled multilateral dependence between units. Schrodt and Mintz do not consider linkages between attributes of states and their behavior. 10. Chapter 3 provides a more thorough...

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