Vehicle of Influence: Building a European Car Market

4. The Politics of Automobile Emissions Control

CHAPTER 4 The Politics of Automobile Emissions Control Introduction The first set o common European standards in the issue ar ea of automobile emissions, finally ena ted in Dec ember 1987 (Dir ective 88 /76/EEC), was strongly contested. The outcome was seen by many to have favored the interests of the auto producers: standards were harmonized, but at a low level. This was very soon fol lowed by a sec ond round of regulation on small aut omobiles, which was m uch more favorable to those wanting hig h environmental standards and imposed considerable costs on producer interests.What explains this change in outcome over such a short period of time? This episode has been the subjec t of much analysis, which has tended to focus on particular institutions or actors in the policy-making process, for example the European Parliament (Tsebelis 1994a) or small member states (Kim 1992). The strength of the analytical approach adopted here is that it shows the way int erests and institutions int eracted. The analysis g ives the analy tical scheme presented in chapter 2 comprehensive empirical support; the cohesion, or lack of it, among states and fi ms over linked issues was crucial. This episode also shows how some of the institutional changes of the SEA may have unintended consequences, which the member states did not foresee. The explanation is a simple one: two sets of preferences were bound t ogether in the issue area of environmental regulation, preferences over the level of emissions control and over the degree of market harmonization (centralized, uniform regulation). Firm and government preferences over emissions control were divided, while preferences over harmonization converged. This condition led to a shift in policy outcomes over time, following institutional change. 85 The institutional environment of the early 1980s permitted a coalition of member states, acting in concert with the interests of several producers, to introduce emissions control regulation at a low level, which increased the level of harmonization by fostering a E urope-wide standard. However, following the SEA, harmonization was disrupted by the unilateral policies of a subset of the member states, for which there was no longer any legal sanction easily available. Harmonization could only be restored by introducing emissions control regulation at a high level. This new institutional environment, in combination with the structure of interest, gave agenda-setting power to the European Parliament (EP). This shift in power, in turn, changed the outcome. Of course, it will be apparent that other conjunctural forces were at work. For example, a crucial turn in policy proposed by the Commission came on the eve of European Parliament elections, in which the environment was a salient issue. However, ad hoc e xplanations for decisi ve elements of the st ory ar e avoided. The outcome depended on the spread of fi m and government preferences , on their ability to cooperate given those preferences, and on the way in which that cooperation was mediated by institutions. The chapter begins with an analysis offi m and government preferences for harmonization and for high environmental standards.Next I present a short history of EU regulation in this area up until the early 1980s,including a discussion of the legal basis for EU regulation,and its consequences for the policies adopted by individual member states. The first a reement, in 1985,is then examined and the role of fi ms, governments, and the institutional en vironment identified Then follows an account of the institutional and legal changes brought about by the SEA, and their consequences. Finally, I explain the subsequent bargain and show the way fi m and member state preferences, in combination with a new institutional environment, resulted in a significant hange in outcomes. The Preferences of Governments and Firms The tension that existed between harmonization and high environmental standards is at the heart of the explanation that follows. The structure of fi m and member state interests was different for each of these issue areas. In environmental issues there was a wide variation in preferences across fi ms and across governments (and high preference intensity). In issues relating to harmonization , preferences more nearly converged. Firms and Technology The preferences of fi ms and go vernments over emissions c ontrol were discussed in chapter 3, and a review of that discussion follows shortly. However, 86 Vehicle of Influen e while the character of the product range in which fi ms...