The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?

Chapter 6. Conclusions

Chapter 6 conclusions I began this study by posing a few simple questions concerning trade’s impact on interstate relations, with the primary question being, Does trade promote peace? To address this question, I argued that it was necessary to investigate a more spatially and temporally diverse group of interstate relations than had previously been considered. In addition, I argued that it was necessary to go beyond the liberal portrayal of a commercial peace and consider alternative interpretations of the impact of trade on interstate relations. In turn, I surveyed the arguments advanced by an eclectic group of critics of liberal thought. Doing so enabled me to draw several conclusions about the overall in›uence of economic interdependence on interstate relations. In light of the empirical ‹ndings, I am now prepared to provide several responses to the questions advanced at the outset of this study. general findings The empirical analyses presented in this study provide little support for the argument that trade promotes peace in dyadic relationships. Instead, I ‹nd that interdependent dyads are more likely to engage in militarized con›icts than those with less extensive trade ties. While trade ties appear to aid states in achieving negotiated settlements to con›ict, this enhanced negotiating capacity presumed to be associated with interdependence does not preclude the escalation of con›ict. Rather, the evidence indicates that interdependent dyads are more likely to experience the most extreme form of con›ict—war. In turning to the state and system levels of analysis, I found that there are differences in trade’s impact across different levels of analysis. In fact, there is some evidence that states that are heavily dependent on trade for their economy are less con›ictual than others. However, we see that the economically strong states in the system are more con›ictual than others, suggesting that there may be contradictions in the perceived dual policy goals of trade contributing to wealth and peace. Further investigation is needed to address the question of how my state-level ‹ndings relate to dyadic-level relationships. I assume that those states enjoying bene‹ts 121 from trade are the ones that are less likely to engage in con›ict, but once again, it is dif‹cult to translate monadic-level phenomena to dyadic-level analysis. Looking at the system level provided a less clear-cut picture about the possibilities for peace associated with increased interdependence . Depending upon how one conceives of both systemic interdependence and con›ict, one’s conclusions about the relationship may differ. The jury is still out on resolving this question, and further investigation is needed. Does this mean that critics of liberalism are more accurate than the liberals in their predictions about trade’s impact on con›ict? In general, no one theoretical position provides an accurate account of the impact of trading relationships. The experience of states within trading relationships differs. As mentioned, few theorists explicitly articulate the hypothesized relationship between trade and con›ict. Those that do so provide little explanation for factors that give rise to variations in trading relationships . Throughout this study, I have focused on one argument made by some critics of liberalism—that symmetrical dependence is different than asymmetrical dependence. From the relevant literature, I inferred that symmetrical ties may offer a hope for peace, since they offer states an opportunity to reap the bene‹ts of trade without being subject to the political manipulation found in less symmetrical relationships. Asymmetrical relationships, on the other hand, subject less powerful states to adverse consequences that may nullify the deterrent effect of trade on con›ict or may heighten tensions that make con›ict more likely. In addition , symmetric ties should be more likely to confer relatively equal bene‹ts to both partners, reducing the likelihood that con›icts will arise over the distribution of the gains for trade. Thus, I reasoned that the greatest hope for peace should arise in relations in which dependence was both symmetric and extensive. However, the evidence does not support my initial proposition. The pacifying effect of balanced dependence was seen only at the lowest level of trade ties. Here, symmetric ties simply re›ected the fact that states were relatively equal in their lack of dependence. That is, both states were relatively independent and were equal in that respect. On the other hand, in situations of extensive trade dependence, states with symmetric ties were found to be more con›ictual. Thus, relationships that I expected to be...