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chapter 5 Doctrine and Education for the New Force Given the prevailing political climate of antipeace operations and the focus on “two major theater war” (2-MTW) strategy during the 1990s, one might not expect the military leadership to devote signi‹cant effort to developing doctrine and education for operations other than major war. Indeed, professional military education, as re›ected by curricula at the midlevel Army and Marine Corps service schools, failed to make signi‹cant adjustments in response to the changes in the operational environment throughout the 1990s. This failure was not due to a lack of doctrine on the topic, however. In addition to older manuals that would have been relevant had they been resurrected, an entirely new crop of peace operations and “MOOTW” doctrine was developed. This chapter presents a detailed overview of the relevant MOOTW-oriented doctrine and the processes by which it was revised throughout the 1990s and beyond. In contrast to the post-Vietnam role of doctrine as an engine of military change, the process in the post–Cold War era, when the tempo of peace operations was high, re›ects the role of doctrine as a trailing indicator of learning and an attempt to institutionalize lessons from the ‹eld. Thus, doctrine becomes both a trailing indicator of experiential adaptation and an engine of change. The Changing Role of Doctrine and Education in the Military Learning Cycle According to the Army’s key ‹eld manual, FM 3-0 Operations, doctrine is the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to uni‹ed action in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements . . . It facilitates communications between Army personnel no matter where they 129 serve, establishes a shared professional culture and approach to operations , and serves as the basis for curriculum in the Army school system . . . To be useful, doctrine must be well known and commonly understood .1 In short, doctrine is what armies are supposed to know. Formal published military doctrine is supposed to guide professional military education and is thus considered by military leaders as an “engine of change.”2 In theory, as new ideas or doctrinal theories are developed , recorded in manuals, and introduced into the education and training systems, actual military practice should change. Thus, military theorists who wish to change the way an army ‹ghts will rewrite the doctrine and see that the revised version is taught to the next generation. Indeed , as described in the previous chapter, this is exactly what happened after the Vietnam War when the AirLand Battle Doctrine was introduced . This doctrine, which proposed an integrated air and land offensive for ‹ghting the Soviets, was a signi‹cant shift from previous doctrine and became the cornerstone for military education, training, and exercises for over a decade. The conventional military wisdom was that the AirLand Battle Doctrine was “validated” through experimentation and in the training centers throughout the 1980s and then in real-life operations during Operation Desert Storm in the 1990 Gulf War.3 Subsequent 21st-century experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has called this into question and generated debate. Where the AirLand Battle Doctrine’s enemy -focused concepts emphasizing speed and maneuver might have helped in winning the short-term military ‹ghts to topple the Taliban and the Iraqi military, they were insuf‹cient or inappropriate in ‹nishing the job and winning the peace in these population-focused con›icts. The story of the progression from AirLand Battle Doctrine to Desert Storm presents the ideal model for doctrine development: a theory is proposed, debated, and recorded; it is tested and “validated” in experiments , practiced in exercises, and disseminated as doctrine throughout the system; ‹nally, it is employed on the battle‹eld. This ideal model still 130 • lifting the fog of peace 1. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (Formerly FM 100-5) (Washington , DC, 2001). 2. Brie‹ng by Lieutenant General David Petreaus, Commander, Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Washington, DC, September 28, 2006. 3. Brigadier General David Fastabend, Deputy Director, Army TRADOC Futures Center , numerous personal interviews by author, 2004–6, Washington, DC; Colonel (USA Ret.) Robert Killebrew, personal interview by author, June 10, 2005, Basin Harbor, VT; James Kit‹eld, Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Of‹cers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War (New York: Brassey’s, 1997; John L. Romjue, “The Evolution of the Airland Battle Concept,” Air University Review (May–June 1984). [18.216.186.164] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 06:45 GMT...

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