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3. Truth and Power: Parrhesia as Counterpower
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three Truth and Power: Parrhesia as Counterpower The philosophers of friendship were, accordingly, concerned to discriminate the type of the ›atterer or adulator from that of the true friend, and the surest sign of the difference was candor and honesty—the parrhesia characteristic of the true friend as opposed to the deceitfulness that marked that parasite. —konstan 1996: 10 lester: Aw, man. You made friends with them. See, friendship is the booze they feed you. They want you to get drunk on feeling like you belong. william: Well, it was fun. lester: They make you feel cool. And hey. I met you. You are not cool . . . My advice to you: I know you think those guys are your friends. You wanna be a true friend to them? Be honest, and unmerciful. —almost famous 2000 What issues and dif‹culties arise and surround the telling of truth in international politics? An investigation into truth-telling as a form of counterpower must, of course, focus on the intersection between truth and power, their relationships and tensions. Such an investigation also requires us to recognize how the practice of politics in›uences the extent to which truth-telling disturbs the ontology of power, for, as Foucault states, “the least glimmer of truth is conditioned by politics” (1984: 5). Yet the purpose in exploring the effects of truth-telling is not to show how a pristine, universal truth can itself be established and disseminated in spite of power, nor is the purpose here to show how power can rein101 corporate a more just truth into its techniques of domination. Rather, I here argue that we might resist the temptation to establish solutions based on some idealized notion of truth, for such solutions, over the long term, will in any case be implemented by those with the resources to do so. Such solutions would then become techniques for further normalization , depoliticization, and domination. This investigation suggests that the proper place for truth is instead within and through, but not above, politics. A politicized truth creates possibilities. Having discussed in the last chapter the practices of re›exive discourse and ›attery, I here investigate a second form of counterpower, parrhesia—frankness, or the telling of truth. Like other forms of counterpower , parrhesia need not be part of an intentional strategy of resistance against power, but it can serve to strip away and reform it by manipulating the unpleasant edges of this power, forcing it to re-act. Section I of the chapter examines parrhesia’s development primarily by Foucault (although a few other advances are noted), and while parrhesia refers to the “telling” of truth, this section articulates why parrhesia is less a form of discourse than it is a forceful moment or occasion. Section II discusses some general conditions that constrain truth-telling in politics. The chapter then deploys these insights through two exercises of modern -day parrhesia: in section III, Cynic parrhesia (as illustrated through its use by al-Qaeda); in section IV, academic-intellectual parrhesia, drawing on not only Foucault but also the work of Hans Morgenthau. Intellectual parrhesia is explicitly engaged through the case illustrations of the experiences of John Dewey during World War I and Morgenthau during the Vietnam War, as well as more contemporary examples stemming from the academy’s posture during the recent U.S. War on Terror. These illustrations explicate the “seductive” qualities of power that serve to inhibit intellectual parrhesia. I. Parrhesia Foucault develops parrhesia in several ways, but it can begin to be understood as a verbal activity whereby the person using it is telling the truth. Foucault’s most inclusive de‹nition of parrhesia is “frankness, freedom and openness that leads one to say what one has to say, as one wishes to say it, when one wishes to say it, and in the form one thinks is necessary for saying it” (2005: 372). Moreover, it is “free speech, released from the rules, freed from rhetorical procedures” (406, emphasis added). Foucault investigated various forms of parrhesia in detail, most directly 102 • defacing power [52.90.181.205] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 07:48 GMT) through two sets of lectures, those given in the spring of 1982 at the College of France (reproduced in Hermeneutics of the Subject [2005]) and in the fall of 1983 at University of California, Berkeley (reproduced in Fearless Speech [2001]). The parrhesiastes “says what is true because he knows that it is true, and he knows that it is true...