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4. Beyond Decision Making in Formal and Informal Groups: The Dutch Cabinet and the West New Guinea Conflict
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CHAPTER 4 Beyond Decision Making in Formal and Informal Groups: The Dutch Cabinet and the West New Guinea Conflict Max V. Metselaar and Bertjan Verbeek Introduction Things are not always as they appear. This banal yet fundamental observation applies to historical analysis as to other life situations. Even a case which at first sight seems a clear example of groupthink leaves unanswered several questions which point to deficiencies in Irving Janis's original groupthink conceptualization.l The case in question is Dutch Cabinet decision making during the last stages of the so-called West New Guinea conflict in 1961 and 1962. During this period the Dutch Government tried to persuade the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia to form a coalition in order to deter Indonesia from attacking Dutch-owned West New Guinea (currently the Indonesian region of Irian Jaya). Specifically, we will argue that small group analysis would benefit from taking into account four key factors which are commonly overlooked. These are: (a) institutional characteristics of the political system in which the group is operating, (b) the occurrence and nature of formal and informal leadership within the group, (c) specific traits of informal leaders, such as their information style and their cognitive belief system, and (d) the dynamic interplay of several, partly overlapping formal and informal groups. The West New Guinea Puzzle The analysis takes as its point of departure prima facie the hypothesis that groupthink may have significantly affected the decision-making process. In our view, this requires the analyst to make a plausible claim that the group in question misinterpreted relevant information that should have led the group to choose a different policy alternative, or that the group could have easily 95 96 Beyond Groupthink obtained such critical information (Verbeek 1994). Such a claim in tum generates a research puzzle: why did this occur? For Dutch Cabinet decision making during the later stages of the West New Guinea conflict (November 1961April 1962), such a puzzle can be found in the assessment of the likelihood that American support, deemed essential for the success of Dutch policies, would be forthcoming. The striking element in that decision-making process is the nearly unanimous belief of cabinet members that the United States would fully support the Dutch government in the event of an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea, despite the availability of massive evidence to the contrary. It was not until late February 1962, when Robert Kennedy visited The Hague during a factfinding mission which had taken him to Jakarta a few weeks earlier, that the Dutch were forced to face the fact that the United States would not back the Dutch in such a contingency. The Attorney General's blunt statements were met with disbelief and disarray.2 Yet, full awareness of the weakness of the Dutch position was not achieved until President Kennedy's letter of April 2 to Dutch Prime Minister Dr. Jan de Quay confirmed the fears provoked by Robert Kennedy's visit.3 At that point, the Dutch had little choice but to accept the plan put forward by the American former diplomat Elsworth Bunker, which envisaged a transfer of West New Guinea to the Indonesian Republic after a nine-month transition period during which the area would be administered as a UN trusteeship. Thus ended a conflict that originated in the 1949 Round Table Conference that had provided for Indonesian independence from the Netherlands, but had left West New Guinea outside the agreement. Between 1949 and 1962 the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the sovereignty of West New Guinea slowly escalated, roughly divided in the following phases:4 Phase 1 (1949-52): Bilateral diplomacy aimed at settling the issue failed when the Dutch Cabinet resigned in 1951 due to internal divisions regarding the desirability of returning the area to Indonesia. Phase 2 (1952-55): This was a period of relative calm during which Indonesia was unable to get the issue on the United Nations agenda. A conference in Geneva failed to bring the two countries close to an agreement. Phase 3 (1956-60): The conflict slowly escalates. Indonesia in 1956 unilaterally withdraws from the Dutch-Indonesian Union, which regulated the mutual preferential treatment of both countries. Indonesia initially put Dutch enterprises under surveillance and then nationalized them. Massive emigration of Dutch citizens from Indonesia followed. Indonesian leaders regularly called for the liberation of West New Guinea and attempted to mobilize popular support (1958-60). The [3.227.229.194] Project MUSE...