The Morality of Laughter

13. The Sociability Thesis: Signaling Trustworthiness A Communitarian Perspective

The Sociability Thesis To breed an animal capable of promising—isn’t that just the paradoxical task which nature has set herself with mankind, the peculiar problem of mankind? Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals In part II we examined the claim that laughter offers signaling gains through its message about a superior life. By laughing, the jester and listener communicate to the butt that his life plan is defective. This chapter examines a second bene‹t offered by laughter. By establishing a bond between jester and listener, laughter permits them to promote their trust in each other. With the trust comes a greater ability to exploit pro‹table opportunities for joint gain. We begin by examining why trust is so important and how laughter has a unique ability to create trust. Signaling Trustworthiness The Need for Trust Although Adam Smith is remembered as the ‹rst economist, several of his key insights were anticipated by David Hume. In particular, the discovery that specialization of trade promotes economic growth should be attributed to Hume, who noted that “different men are by nature ‹tted for different employments, and attain to greater perfection in any one, when they con‹ne themselves to it alone.”1 By specializing, the baker can restrict his business to bread-making; he can buy his ›our from merchants and need not grow and mill his own grain. But this assumes that he can trust the merchant to supply him with ›our when he needs it. With178 13 out trust, the parties cannot rely on each other and are driven back to producing all their own goods and forgoing the gains from specialization. Hume’s account of the gains available through specialization explains why the institution of contract law is valuable. When a party who breaches his contractual obligations knows that he may be made to pay damages, his incentive to perform the obligation is strengthened, and the other party is better able to trust him. What happens where contracts are not feasible, however? The promisor might live in a place where the normal writs of the common law do not run—in Mississippi, possibly. Alternatively, the promise might be too vague to be easily enforced (or to trust to an American jury). Long-term contracts between business parties necessarily leave many details to be decided at a later time. In such cases, the problem of trust cannot readily be solved by contract . Yet the need for trust remains. It is a crucial element in the social norms that Jon Elster calls the cement of society. Without trust our friendships would becomes affairs of momentary convenience, on which no plans, no projects for future cooperation, could be formed. We rely so often upon friends and associates that we often forget we are doing so. We scatter our promises about, without paying much attention to what we are doing. We make seemingly trivial promises, to meet for lunch or to return a call, on whose performance deep friendships depend. And we make unspoken promises that are the foundation of trust: I will take your side; I will not betray you. Self-Binding Gains Let us suppose that the parties wish to enter into a long-term relationship and cannot do so by contract. Without contractual fetters, how can a promisor signal his good faith to a promisee? Rousseau thought that we should be forced to be free, but our promisor seeks the freedom to be forced. He wishes to restrict his ability to breach in order to persuade the promisee to trust him. In this he is like Ulysses, who wished to hear the song the Sirens sing.2 Since those who hear the music are led to the reefs and a watery grave, he lashed himself to the mast and stopped the ears of his crew with wax. As they rowed past, he heard the music but could not untie his cords to unstop the ears of his crew and direct them to the rocks. So they rowed safely on, without hearing either the Siren song or the commands of their enchanted captain. Like Ulysses, the promisor seeks to restrict his future freedom of The Sociability Thesis 179 action in order to exploit a gain. And, like Ulysses, he might have to bind his hands through noncontractual means where a contract cannot be written. This might happen when the parties deal with each other on a repeat...