Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure

Index

Index Abreu, D., 110 abstention in elections, 253, 304 acyclic preference aggregation rule, 4 agenda amendment, 29 binary, 113 defined, 116 endogenous, 166 issue-by-issue, 61 agenda independence, 139 agenda-setting game equilibrium, 174 and majority core, 182 and sincere voting, 185 existence, 177 Aliprantis, C.D., 231 Allais Paradox, 14 allocation, 94 amendment agenda admissible, 138 and status quo, 138 as a collective choice rule, 29, 51 defined, 132 endogenous, 173 two-stage, 144 voting tree representation, 115 appropriations process, 189 Aranson, P., 330 Arrovian aggregation rule, 30 Arrow Possibility Theorem, 22 Arrow, K.J., 18, 67 augmented median voter rule, 37 Austen-Smith, D., 18, 111, 190, 191, 330,417 Axelrod, R., 417 backwards induction, 205 Baliga, S., 110 Ball, R., 331 Banks set, 146 Banks, J.S., 18, 111, 146, 190, 191, 252, 271, 330, 331, 417 Barbera, S., 67 bargaining axiomatic, 252 demand, 252 legislative, 392 bargaining theory and impatience, 196 and recognition probabilities, 195 distributive, 204, 225 over policy, 225 sequential, 194 two-person, 193 Baron, D.P., 251, 252, 417 battle of the sexes, 202 Besley, T., 390 best response, 85 Black, D., 67, 190 Borda rule and Maskin monotonicity, 85 as scoring rule, 336 defined, 19 445 446 Border, K.C., 68, 153, 231 Bordes, G., 146 budget process, 189 Calvert, R., 252, 331 Camerer, C., 18 candidate uncertainty, 283 over policy-independent bias, 284 over voter policy preferences, 284 candidates, 254 and agenda control, 298 and entry, 354 benefit of winning, 355 cost of entry, 355 office-motivated, 255 policy-motivated, 293 potential, 354 serious, 350 winning, 355 winning at v, 349 caretaker government, 393 chaos theorems, 324 Ching, S., 68 citizen candidates, 360 citizen sovereignty, 36 Clarke, E., 111 classical efficiency theorem, 327 close race, 349 closed rule, 189 coalition government, 158, 163, 244, 395 Coate, S., 390 Cohen, L., 330 collective choice function anonymous, 51 citizen sovereignty, 36 constant, 80 defined, 8 dictatorial, 21 full range, 31 INDEX manipulable, 21 peak monotonic, 48 peak only condition, 42 respects unanimity, 22 self-implementable, 74 strategy-proof, 21 strongly monotonic, 109 unanimity condition, 42 uncompromising, 48 collective choice rule anonymous, 8 defined, 8 implementable, 72 neutral, 67 no veto property, 82 path independence, 145 property Q, 145 property E, 145 resolute, 8 strategy resistant, 89 truthfully implementable, 72 committee, 159 assignment, 159 delegation, 190 jurisdiction, 159 system, 159 committee equilibrium, 160 sequential, 161 compact set general definition, 231 in Euclidean space, 2 Condorcet consistent, 162 criterion, 42 winner, 51 as sophisticated outcome, 130 continuation value, 209 contour sets of a preference relation, 2 of a utility function, 2 INDEX convex preferences, 2 convex set set, 2 Corchon, L., 110 core and bargaining, 236 issue-by-issue and sophisticated voting, 156 defined, 149 existence of, 153 majority, 61 of a preference aggregation rule, 7 portfolio allocation, 190 correspondence closed graph property, 151 continuous, 151 lower hemi-continuous, 150 upper hemi-continuous, 150 costless campaign, 354 Coughlin, P., 331 covering relation deep covering, 278 in the finite model, 134 in the spatial model, 269 Cox threshold, C(s; m), 339 Cox, G.W., 330, 389 D term, 331 Dasgupta, P., 110 Davis, 0., 330 de Groot, M., 330 decisive coalitions defined, 4 minimum winning, 199 monotonic, 4 of a preference aggregation rule, 4 proper, 4 decisive structure, 5 447 deep uncovered set, 278 Denzau, A., 190, 389 dictator for collective choice, 21 for preference aggregation, 4 Diermeier, D., 417 Director's Law, 293 domain continuous and convex, n~s, 3 separable, n~ep, 64 unrestricted, nn, 3 weighted Euclidean, W n , 53 dominance solvability and binary voting trees, 124 of game forms, 122 Downs, A., 330, 331 Duggan, J., 191, 252, 271, 279, 330, 331 Duverger's Law, 352 as two-position equilibria, 382 Duverger, M., 389 elections multicandidate, 333 two-candidate, 253 electoral equilibria and the uncovered set, 268, 271 uniqueness in finite games, 265 electoral equilibrium and the core, 257, 294 citizen-candidate, 360 in symmetric voting, 279 multicandidate, 338 convergence, 341 with entry, 355 open-agenda, 366 Poisson, 321 policy-motivated candidate, 294 probabilistic voting, 285 two-candidate, 257 448 electoral rule, 90, 253 as a mechanism, 91 dictatorial, 92 plurality, 285 preference monotonic, 92 rank scoring, 334 simple, 255 vote monotonic, 91 electoral uncertainty, 301 Enelow, J., 331 Epstein, L., 18 equilibrium ,8-equilibrium, 71 dominant strategy, 75 legislative, 394 legislative election, 395 Nash, 78 no-delay, 211, 231 Poisson voting, 317 quasi-symmetric mixed, 308 stationary, 209 uniqueness...