-
Bibliography
- University of Michigan Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
Bibliography [1] Abreu, D. and H. Matsushima 1992. Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. Econometrica, 60:993-1008. [2] Aliprantis, C.D. and KC. Border 1999. Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker's Guide (2nd. ed). New York: Springer. [3] Aranson, P., M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook 1974. Election goals and strategies: equivalent and nonequivalent election strategies. American Political Science Review, 68:135-152. [4] Arrow, KJ. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd. ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press. [5] Arrow, KJ. 1970. Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. Chicago: Markham. [6] Austen-Smith, D. 1987. Sophisticated sincerity: voting over endogenous agendas. American Political Science Review, 81:1323-1329. [7] Austen-Smith, D. 1989. Sincere voting in models of legislative elections . Social Choice and Welfare, 6:287-299. [8] Austen-Smith, D. 1996. Electing legislatures. In N. Schofield (ed) Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. New York: Kluwer-Nijhoff. [9] Austen-Smith, D. 2000. Redistributing income under proportional representation . Journal of Political Economy, 108:1235-1269. [10] Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks 1988. Elections, coalitions and legislative outcomes. American Political Science Review, 82:405-422. 429 430 BIBLIOGRAPHY [11] Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks 1990. Stable governments and the allocation of policy portfolios. American Political Science Review, 84:891-906. [12] Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks 1991. Monotonicity in electoral systems . American Political Science Review, 85:531-537. [13] Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks 1999. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. [14] Axelrod, R. 1970. Conflict of Interest. Chicago: Markham. [15] Baliga, S., L.C. Corchon and T. Sjostrom 1997. The theory of implementation when the planner is a player. Journal of Economic Theory, 77:15-33. [16] Ball, R. 1999. Discontinuity and nonexistence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model. Social Choice and Welfare, 16:533556 . [17] Banks, J.S. 1985. Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control. Social Choice and Welfare, 1:295-306. [18] Banks, J.S. 1989. Equilibrium outcomes in two-stage amendment procedures . American Journal of Political Science, 32:25-43. [19] Banks, J.S. and G. Bordes 1988. Voting games, indifference and consistent sequential choice rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 5:31-44. [20] Banks, J.S. and J. Duggan 2000. A bargaining model of collective choice. American Political Science Review, 94:733-788. [21] Banks, J.S. and J. Duggan 2001. Existence of Nash equilibria on convex sets. Working Paper, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester. [22] Banks, J.S. and J. Duggan 2002. A bargaining model of legislative policy-making. Working Paper, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester. [23] Banks, J.S. and J. Duggan 2003. Probabilistic voting in the spatial model of elections: the theory of office-motivated candidates. In D. Austen-Smith and J. Duggan (eds.), Social Choice and Strategic Decisions : Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks. Berlin: Springer. BIBLIOGRAPHY 431 [24] Banks, J.S., J. Duggan and M. Le Breton 2002. Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections. Journal of Economic Theory, 103:88-105. [25] Banks, J.S., J. Duggan and M. Le Breton 2003. Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model. Working Paper, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester. [26] Banks, J.S. and F. Gasmi 1987. Endogenous agenda formation in three person committees. Social Choice and Welfare, 54:133-152. [27] Barbera, S. 1977. Manipulation of social decision functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 15:226-278. [28] Barbera, S., F. Gul and E. Stacchetti 1993. Generalized median voter schemes and committees. Journal of Economic Theory, 61:262-289. [29] Baron, D.P. 1991a. Majoritarian incentives, pork barrel programs, and procedural control. American Journal of Political Science, 34:57-90. [30] Baron, D.P. 1991b. A spatial bargaining theory of government formation in parliamentary systems. American Political Science Review, 85:137-164· [31] Baron, D.P and D. Diermeier. 2001. Elections, governments and parliaments in proportional representation systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116:933-967. [32] Baron, D.P. and J.A. Ferejohn 1989. Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83:1181-1206. [33] Besley, T. and S. Coate 1997. An economic model of representative democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112:85-114. [34] Billingsley, P. 1968. Convergence of Probability Measures. New York: John Wiley & Sons. [35] Black, D. 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [36J Black, D. and R.A. Newing 1951. Committee...